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DEFINING ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’: RESOLVING
AMBIGUITY IN THE CFIUS REGULATIONS
CHRISTOPHER M. TIPLER*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS” or “the Committee”) is responsible for reviewing all
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in the United States for potential
national security concerns raised by the transaction. However, the
executive orders, legislation, and regulations concerning the
Committee (“the regulations”) have never defined “national
security,”1 nor have they provided clear guidance regarding the
scope of the Committee’s national security review.2
This
uncertainty did not initially pose many problems because of the
toothless nature of the Committee throughout most of its
existence.3 However, with the increased focus on national security
* Christopher M. Tipler, student at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, Philadelphia, PA. I would like to thank Giovanna Cinelli and Ken
Nunnenkamp for providing me with the knowledge and inspiration necessary to
write this Note. I would also like to thank Professors Derek Jinks and Christopher
Yoo for the consultation during the drafting process. Finally, I would like to
thank the members of the University of Pennsylvania’s Journal of International
Law for their assistance with the editing process.
1 See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by
Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70702, 70705 (Nov. 21, 2008) (describing CFIUS’s
rejection of comments that national security be defined in favor of a case-by-case
review).
2 Christopher M. Weimar, Note, Foreign Direct Investment and National
Security Post-FINSA 2007, 87 TEX. L. REV. 663, 674 (2009) (“Like the term ‘national
security,’ many of the above-mentioned factors are intentionally left open to
interpretation by the Executive.”). This lack of definition could potentially violate
the Non-Delegation Doctrine or the Intelligible Principle Doctrine; however, such
an analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
3 See Chip Yost, Bush Approves Sale of US Military Parts Suppliers to UAE
Government,
BALT.
CHRON.
(May
1,
2006),
http://baltimorechronicle.com/2006/050106Chip.shtml (“The committee almost
never met, and when it deliberated it was usually at a fairly low bureaucratic
level,” according to former Reagan administration defense official Richard Perle,
who described the process as “a bit of a joke.”). However, some did note concerns
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issues after September 11th and the passage of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”), the lack
of sufficient national security guidance in the CFIUS regulations
has begun to impose significant costs on parties engaging in FDI.
There is no accurate measure of these costs, but an analysis of
the CFIUS review process, available data, case studies of significant
cross-border deals, and other available information demonstrates
that these costs are substantial. From 2008–2012, a total of 538
transactions underwent CFIUS review, but this number is
increasing annually.4 The $542 million publicly reported value of
these deals in the 2013 Annual Report is a severe underestimate,
because it includes only the publicly reported value of just
eighteen of the filed transactions.5 Furthermore, the true costs are
not reflected in this data, as many other factors impose additional
costs. First, the failure to define national security increases
uncertainty and delays transactions, significantly reducing the
deals’ value.6 Second, parties will often expend considerable time
and capital agreeing to the structure of a deal, only to see it
collapse when it becomes apparent that CFIUS will block the deal.7
Third, the Committee’s costs of monitoring and review are greater
about the scope of the Committee’s authority soon after its creation. See W.
Robert Shearer, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation
Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1733 (1994) (“If Congress does not
define and narrow Exon-Florio’s scope, this attitude may soon find expression at
the expense of foreigners seeking to invest in the United States, and ultimately, to
the detriment of the U.S. economy.”).
4
Although the highest number of notices in one calendar year occurred in
2008 with 155, the number of notices dipped dramatically in 2009 due to the
financial crisis, reaching a low of 65. For the complete lists of available statistics
for 2008–2012, see COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2013) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2013]; COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE
U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2012]. See
generally Aimen N. Mir, CFIUS Staff Chair, Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.
(CFIUS) (2012) (unpublished presentation slides).
5 ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 30, 32. In 2011, the financial value of
the twelve publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee was
$682.25 million. ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 4, at 28. In 2010, the financial
value of the seven publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee
was $1.4 billion. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
33 (2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2011]. In 2009, the financial value of the
twelve publicly reported M&A transactions filed with the Committee was $3.2
billion. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 26 (2010)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2010].
6 See generally infra Section 4.3 (indicating that uncertainty regarding national
security concerns can lead to additional costs).
7 Id.
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due to the absence of clear direction regarding the national security
review.8 Finally, the lack of clarity regarding national security
allows the Committee and the President to block transactions for
seemingly political reasons, which can lead to retaliatory measures
by the host countries of the companies whose investment is
blocked.9 Each of these costs will likely continue to rise if the
regulations are not amended to more clearly explain the national
security evaluation process.10 Therefore, the regulations should be
amended to provide additional clarity to investors, reducing these
costs and promoting additional FDI, without diminishing the
Committee’s ability to block transactions threatening U.S. national
security.
This paper will provide an overview of the history of the
Committee, an analysis of the current regulations and the costs
stemming from the failure to define national security, and a
recommendation of how the regulations could be amended to
reduce these costs. Section 2 will provide a brief history of CFIUS,
focusing on how the scope and potency of the Committee’s powers
have gradually increased in response to certain proposed
transactions. Section 3 will explain the filing and review process
under FINSA, with special attention paid to the limited guidance
regarding the evaluation of national security threats. Section 4 will
discuss the costs of the current regime using basic economic
principles, the Committee’s annual report to Congress, case studies
of proposed transactions, and similar bodies in other countries.
Finally, Section 5 will propose a potential solution that seeks to
balance the Committee’s desire to maintain flexibility and the
financial benefits of providing international businesspersons with a
clear understanding of which transactions may be delayed or
blocked by CFIUS.
This paper proposes the creation of a regime that closely
resembles prominent export laws in the United States.11 Under this
regime, CFIUS would publish lists of industries and technologies
that are presumed to raise national security concerns. If the U.S.
industry or technology sought by the foreign acquirer appeared on
8
See generally infra Section 4.4 (analyzing how the Committee’s costs may
decrease with greater clarity regarding the evaluation of national security).
9 See generally infra Section 4.5 (exploring potential retaliatory measures).
10 See generally infra Section 3.4 (describing how costs have increased with the
Committee’s scope).
11 See generally infra Section 5 (discussing potential reforms).
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the list, the foreign acquirer would cross-reference a country chart
designating whether or not acquisitions of that specific industry or
technology by an acquirer from that host country would be
presumed to require a CFIUS national security investigation. In
addition, CFIUS would be granted the authority to designate
certain companies as presumed threats to U.S. national security.
However, CFIUS and the President would maintain discretionary
authority to either permit transactions presumed to threaten U.S.
national security, or block transactions not presumed to be national
security risks. By providing these clear criteria, the Committee
could more effectively balance the encouragement of FDI in the
United States with the protection of U.S. national security interests.
2.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CFIUS

CFIUS was established by executive order in 1975. This order
granted the Committee “primary continuing responsibility . . . for
monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United
States . . . and for coordinating the implementation of United States
policy on such investment.”12 Although the Committee had the
authority to review transactions that “might have major
implications for United States national interests,”13 it did not have
the authority to block transactions posing national security risks.
This came into sharp focus due to the rise of FDI under President
Reagan, culminating with Fujitsu Ltd.’s attempted acquisition of
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. in 1986.14 Due to concerns of the
deal’s opponents, such as the Department of Defense (“DoD”), that
this would give the Japanese access to sensitive technologies that
Fairchild provided to U.S. defense contractors, CFIUS initiated a
review.15
Fujitsu withdrew its offer before the Committee
completed its review, but this transaction served as a catalyst for
granting CFIUS the power to block transactions affecting U.S.
national security interests.
This power came by way of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment
to Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“Exon-Florio”).16
Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990(1)(b) (1975).
Id. at § 990(1)(b)(3).
14
See Stephen K. Pudner, Moving Forward from Dubai Ports World—The
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1279
(2008) (analyzing FDI increases under President Reagan).
15 See id. (delineating the concerns stemming from the Fujitsu deal).
16
The Exon-Florio Amendment was passed as part of the Omnibus Trade
12
13
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Exon-Florio granted the President the power to initiate an
investigation by CFIUS17 into the national security effects of
transactions that may result in foreign control of a U.S. business or
asset and to prohibit or suspend transactions that pose national
security threats.18 The President could exercise this power if there
was “credible evidence” of a national security threat,19 and no
other provision of the law provided “adequate and appropriate
remedy to protect the national security” interests of the United
States.20 If the President exercised this authority, he was required
to submit a written report to Congress.21 Finally, the President’s
actions were not subject to judicial review,22 reflecting the
deference given to the President on national security issues.23
The next important expansion of the Committee’s powers came
from the 1993 Byrd Amendment, which mandated that CFIUS
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
Executive Order 12661 implements the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988. See Exec. Order No. 12661, 3 C.F.R. § 618 (1988) (stating a purpose of
“ensur[ing] that the international trade policy of the United States shall be
conducted and administered in a way that achieves the economic, foreign policy,
and national security objectives of the United States . . . under the direction of the
President . . .”); see also Mathew R. Byrne, Note, Protecting National Security and
Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
849, 857 (2006) (attributing Exon-Florio as “a response to the serious decline in
United States competitiveness and the rapid growth of our trade deficit.”)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100–40, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1987)).
17
Executive Order 12661 designated CFIUS as the agency to run the
investigation. See Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. § 990(8) (1975) (“The Chairman
of the Committee, in consultation with other members of the Committee, is hereby
delegated the authority to issue regulations to implement Section 721 of the
Defense Production Act”).
18 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170(a–d) (2000), amended by Pub L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246, 259 (2007) (authorizing
the President or his designee to “make an investigation to determine the effects on
national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers . . . by or with foreign
persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate
commerce of the United States” and allowing “the President [to] take such action
for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any
acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States . . . by or for with foreign persons so the such control.”).
19 Id. at § 2170(e)(1).
20 Id. at § 2170(e)(2).
21
Id. at § 2170(g) (mandating the President to file reports upon the
completion of an investigation).
22
Id. at § 2170(e) (stating that the President’s decisions are not subject to
judicial review).
23
See Byrne, supra note 16, at 861 (asserting that placing Exon-Florio in
Defense Production Act on trade shows the primacy of national security).
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review all transactions where a foreign government controls the
acquirer or where the acquirer acts on behalf of a foreign
government.24 Following the attempted acquisition of LTV Steel’s
Missile Division, which held DoD contracts, by Thomson-CSF, a
French government-owned corporation, Congress issued the Byrd
Amendment “to ensure that such deals were properly vetted in the
future.”25 Therefore, Congress replaced the optional nature of
Exon-Florio with a mandatory regime requiring an investigation
any time a transaction would result in foreign control of a U.S.
business or asset and pose a potential threat to the national security
of the United States.26 Despite having little effect on the CFIUS
process,27 the regime put in place by the Byrd Amendment would
remain for over a decade before another transaction would
threaten U.S. national security and spur further change to the
CFIUS regulations.
3.

MODERN CFIUS REGULATIONS

Two general trends contributed significantly
implementation of the modern CFIUS regulations:

to the
(1) the

24
National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 § 837(a), Pub. L. 102–484
(1993) (mandating CFIUS investigations “in any instance in which an entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any
merger, acquisition, or takeover which could . . . affect the national security of the
United States.”).
25 Pudner, supra note 14, at 1277.
26 The act also changed the President’s reporting requirements by mandating
a report on whether or not the President took action instead of only when
requiring an investigation, as under Exon-Florio. The Byrd provision required a
report anytime an investigation is conducted and the parties do not withdraw the
transaction. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b), amended by Pub. L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246,
259 (2007) (describing the review procedures required by the act). In addition, the
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992 implemented reporting
requirements. See also Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102–
558, 106 Stat. 4198 (1992) (requiring reporting every four years as to whether there
is a targeted attempt by other countries to attain U.S. critical technologies and
whether there is economic espionage against the interests of the United States).
However, they did not require a report on national security matters. See Foreign
Direct Investment, the Exon-Florio Foreign Acquisition Review Process, and H.R. 2624,
the Technology Preservation Act of 1991, to Amend the 1988 Exon-Florio Provision:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin.
and Urb. Aff., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Foreign Direct Investment
Hearings] (“[W]e have not defined national security. I think the intent of Congress
was very clear, that national security should be looked at in a broad sense” and
defining it would let companies circumvent the definition).
27
See Byrne, supra note 16, at 868 (“[T]he Byrd Amendment has had little
actual effect on the Exon-Florio framework or process”).
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increased emphasis on national security issues in the wake of
September 11th and (2) the global economic integration through
globalization.28 With these trends as the backdrop, the proposed
investments by China National Offshore Oil Corp. (“CNOOC”) in
Unocal Corp. and by Dubai Ports World (“DPW”) in Peninsular &
Oriental Steam Navigation Company in 2005 and 2006,
respectively, spurred action to bolster CFIUS’s powers. CNOOC, a
Chinese government-owned oil company, sought to acquire the
American oil company Unocal, which would have resulted in
CNOOC controlling Unocal’s oil reserves.29 Although CFIUS
never approved or even reviewed the transaction, congressional
fear that the Committee would not block the transaction led to calls
to revise Exon-Florio.30 Soon thereafter, DPW, a state-owned ports
management company from the United Arab Emirates, attempted
to acquire Peninsular & Oriental Stream Navigation Co., which
would have given DPW operating rights in six American ports.31
When news broke that CFIUS had approved the transaction, it
became clear that the Committee’s national security review was
ineffectual, and a congressional maelstrom followed.32 In response,
CFIUS and DPW agreed to a forty-five day investigation, but DPW
ultimately arranged to sell its U.S. port leases to a U.S. company
when Congress moved to force divestiture through legislation.33
28
James Mendenhall, Introductory Remarks at the Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Economic Politics
and National Security: A CFIUS Case Study (Apr. 11, 2008), in 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 245, 245–46 (2008).
29
For a detailed discussion of the CNOOC transaction, see generally Joshua
W. Casselman, Note, China’s Latest ‘Threat’ to the United States: The Failed CNOOCUnocal Merger and its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 155 (2007) (discussing the CNOOC transaction).
30 See Byrne, supra note 16, at 852 (citing Christopher Corr, Pressures to Stiffen
Exon-Florio: The Chinese Bid for Unocal Sparks a Firefight over Inbound Deals, MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS, DEALMAKER’S J. 36, (2006)) (explaining how calls to reform
Exon-Florio arose).
31 See id. at 851 (outlining the proposed deal structure) (citations omitted).
32
See id. at 852 (“[M]any members of Congress had publicly and forcefully
expressed grave reservations . . . .”); see also Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Is Your CrossBorder Deal the Next National Security Lightening Rod?, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 31 (2007)
(“[B]ipartisan political concern over port security caused DP World voluntarily to
request that CFIUS conduct a new review of the transaction . . . .”).
33
See Gotts et al., supra note 32, at 32 (“Ultimately, facing the threat of
congressional legislation to force divestiture, DP World agreed to sell the U.S. port
leases to a U.S. company.”). For a discussion of congressional blocking of the
DPW and CNOOC transactions, see David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional
Notification Service, S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 83, 98–101 (2010) (describing the role of
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The concerns surrounding these two proposed transactions led
to the passage of the Foreign Investment in the United States Act of
2007 (FINSA), which was the first statutory codification of CFIUS.
FINSA’s preamble clearly states that the new rules are designed to
“ensure national security while promoting foreign investment”
and “to reform the process by which such investments are
examined for any effect they may have on national security.”34
This reflects how CFIUS is designed to balance foreign investment
and national security;35 however, the regulations explicitly do not
provide a definition for national security.36 Instead, the regulations
state that guidance as to how national security should be defined
will be published in the Federal Register. Soon after FINSA’s
passage, President George W. Bush issued an executive order that
expanded CFIUS membership to a potentially vast number of
agencies, clarified the President’s role in evaluating covered
transactions, and explicitly authorized the use of mitigation
Finally,
agreements to resolve national security concerns.37
Treasury published the aforementioned Guidance Concerning the
National Security Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign
Congress in setting foreign investment policy as informed by CFIUS).
34
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Preamble, Pub. L.
No. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007). Executive Order 13456 amended Executive Order
11858 to incorporate the changes made by FINSA, namely reviewing results in
control by a foreign person. It similarly states intent to support “unequivocally
such investment, consistent with the protection of national security.” Exec. Order
No. 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (2008).
35
Nova Daly, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: Economic Politics and National Security:
A CFIUS Case Study (Apr. 11, 2008), in 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 245, 248 (2008)
[hereinafter Daly Statement].
One of those lessons is that when people fear that the national security is
jeopardized, they can take actions that also jeopardize an open
investment environment. So ensuring that people know that you are
doing the due diligence you need to do to ensure national security can
also ensure that America can maintain its open investment policy. Id.
36
Instead, the regulations state that guidance will be published in the
Federal Register. For a more detailed discussion, see Section 3.3 (discussing the
definition of national security).
37
Exec. Order No. 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008) (reiterating its
objective of “support[ing] unequivocally such investment, consistent with the
protection of the national security”). The President will be involved when the
Committee recommends blocking the transaction, is unable to reach a decision of
whether the transaction should be blocked, or when the Committee requests that
the President make the determination. 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b) (2008) (codifying the
executive order through implementing regulations).
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Investment in the United States (“the Guidance”),38 which has a
“narrow focus on national security alone” and disregards other
national interests.39 However, as will be discussed below,40 the
Guidance provides only vague direction on what constitutes a
national security risk, resulting in a broad national security
review.41
With this legal framework in mind,42 the following subsections
will address the current state of CFIUS. This includes a discussion
of the current members and their respective roles within the
Committee, filing requirements for voluntary notices, an overview
of the CFIUS review process, and an analysis of the scope of the
Committee’s powers under the regulations.
3.1. CFIUS Membership
CFIUS is an interagency committee composed of fifteen agency
heads with Treasury as the Chair.43 Of these members, Treasury
38
See generally Guidance Concerning the National Security Review
Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed.
Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Guidance] (describing the regulatory
guidance on national security review).
39
See id. at 74568 (asserting that CFIUS focuses solely on real national
security issues).
40 See Section 3.3.2.
41
See Jonathon G. Cedarbaum & Stephen W. Preston, CFIUS and Foreign
Investment, in HOMELAND SECURITY: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 235, 241 (Joe D.
Whitley & Lynne K. Zusman eds., 2009) (“FINSA leaves CFIUS with broad
discretion to determine if a transaction threatens national security.”).
42 In summary, the key legal bases of CFIUS are as follows: (1) § 721 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170; (2) ExonFlorio (part of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988), Pub. L. 100–418,
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (1988); (3) Executive Order 11858, which established
CFIUS as Executive Branch interagency committee; (4) Executive Order 12661, 54
Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988), which delegated authority under Exon-Florio to
CFIUS; (5) Executive Order 13456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008), which
amended Executive Order 11858 to incorporate FINSA changes; and (6)
Regulations pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 31 C.F.R. Part 800. The Guidance, supra note 38, supplements these
regulations. More information is available at www.treasury.goc/cfius.
43
Under FINSA, the Attorney General’s office, the Departments of
Homeland Security, Defense, Commerce, State, and Energy serve as full voting
members, and the heads of the Department of Labor and the Department of
National Intelligence (“DNI”) will serve as non-voting ex officio members. See 50
U.S.C. app. 2170(k) (listing Committee members under FINSA). Executive Order
13456 added the United States Trade Representative and the Director of the Office
of Science and Technology to the Committee. See Exec. Order No. 13456, 73 Fed.
Reg. 4677 § 3 (Jan. 23, 2008) (supplementing the list of original Committee
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and Department of National Intelligence (“DNI”) have particularly
notable roles. First, at the beginning of the review period, Treasury
is responsible for designating a lead agency or agencies to serve as
its co-lead throughout the review process.44 This designation
normally goes to the agency with the most interest in or questions
about the transaction. If CFIUS determines that the transaction
raises national security concerns, the co-lead agency’s role becomes
increasingly important, because it will be responsible for
negotiating, imposing, and monitoring mitigation agreements
designed to address the national security threats posed by the
transaction.45 Second, DNI46 shall “expeditiously carry out a
thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the
United States posed by any covered transaction.”47 This analysis
must be independent but must also incorporate the opinions of
each reviewing intelligence agency.48 Therefore, DNI serves as the
de facto agency responsible for making final determinations on the
national security implications of a transaction.
CFIUS’s structure reflects the Committee’s stated objective of

members and stating that the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of
the Counsel of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism are all to “observe
and, as appropriate, participate in” CFIUS reviews).
Finally, other agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Transportation,
may participate on a case-by-case basis as needed. Id. at § 10 (observing that other
agencies may assist as needed on the Committee’s request).
44
See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(k)(5) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall
designate, as appropriate, a member or members of the Committee to be the lead
agency or agencies on behalf of the Committee . . . .”).
45 See id. (outlining the steps the co-lead agency are required to take).
46
DNI is an ex officio, non-voting member but receives all votes from other
Committee members. For a full description of DNI’s role, see 50 U.S.C. app.
2170(b)(4).
The Director of National Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a
thorough analysis of any threat to the national security of the United
States posed by any covered transaction. The Director of National
Intelligence shall also seek and incorporate the views of all affected or
appropriate intelligence agencies with respect to the transaction. Id.
47
50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(4)(A). DNI can start its review before receiving a
formal filing, so DNI prefers to receive notifications in advance.
48
Id. DNI must provide its opinion within 20 days but can be granted an
extension. 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(4)(B) (noting that the report must be filed “not
later than 20 days” after the notice).
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balancing national security and open investment policy.49 In
addition, DoD seems to receive greater deference than other
Committee members due to its omniscient presence in the national
security space.50 Treasury’s position as Chair reflects concerns
early in the Committee’s development that the national security
review’s potential breadth could become a significant barrier to
FDI.51 Moreover, Treasury’s authority is meant to “serve as a
reminder to the outside world—and presumably to CFIUS
members—that open investment is an important goal that should
be sustained unless there are serious national security problems
with a transaction.”52 However, since Treasury does not make any
final determinations regarding whether to permit the transaction,
other motivations supersede the encouragement of FDI.53
3.2. Filing Requirements & Timeline of CFIUS Process
According to the regulations, the entire CFIUS process can take
up to ninety days and involve up to three primary stages. First,
CFIUS will conduct a thirty-day review, which is initiated by a
voluntary submission by the parties or a request for a filing from
the Committee, to determine if the transaction is “covered.”
Second, the Committee may conduct a forty-five day investigation
if it determines that the transaction may raise national security
concerns. Finally, the Committee may submit its recommendation
to the President, who is given fifteen days to determine whether or
not to block the proposed transaction.
3.2.1. Filing & Initial Thirty Day Review
CFIUS review can be initiated either by a voluntary notice by
the parties to the transaction to CFIUS or a request for submission
by the Committee.54 Although filing is technically voluntary,
49 See Byrne, supra note 16, at 893 (“Finally, the current membership structure
of CFIUS and its preference to operate by consensus ensure that both national
security and an open investment policy are protected, while not short-changing
either goal.”).
50
See id. (“Because of its unique role in the national security arena, the
Department of Defense seems to be given a great degree of deference by other
members of CFIUS.”).
51 See Section 4.1 (describing the breadth of national security review).
52 Byrne, supra note 16, at 893–94.
53 This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.
54 For a notice to be considered complete, it must include the following: (1)
terms of the transaction, including the parties, nature, and scope of agreement; (2)
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CFIUS can request that parties submit the necessary materials if it
determines that the transaction “may” be a “covered transaction,”
which is defined broadly.55 In reality, the Committee’s request for
a filing is actually a mandate, and it can be made up to three years
after the completion of the transaction.56 As a result, it is in the
parties’ interest to be proactive and voluntarily file with the
Committee. Voluntarily filing a complete notice not only improves
the efficiency of the review process,57 but it also increases the
certainty surrounding their transaction. In addition, parties who
voluntarily file receive regulatory safe harbor, immunizing them
against subsequent CFIUS reviews and investigations once their
transaction is approved absent misrepresentations during the
CFIUS process.58 Therefore, it is in both the companies’ and the
description of assets; (3) description of U.S. company’s business activities,
including classified contracts over the last five years and government contracts
over prior three years if dealing with national security, defense, or homeland
security; (4) details about products, technical data, technology, or services sold to
U.S. government; (5) products, technical data, technology, or services for which
the target is a “sole source” or a single “qualified source”; (6) products or services
sold by third party and rebranded; (7) services target provided on behalf of or
under the name of another entity; (8) DPAS-rated contract information; (9)
products subject to EAR and/or ITAR listed and with details provided, including
licenses and authorizations that will transfer; (10) documentation “relevant to” the
target’s export classifications including any commodity jurisdiction
determinations, completed or pending, or any Commerce classifications; (11)
Department of Energy-related export activity; (12) toxins or special agents
activity; and (13) any history of prior CFIUS activity. 31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c).
55
See id. (explaining that if the Committee then determines that the
transaction is covered, it will request a complete filing from the parties to the
transaction).
56
31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (observing reporting requirements for voluntary
notices).
57
See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74572 (“In CFIUS’s experience, the
efficiency of reviews is also enhanced when parties to transactions voluntarily
provide in their notice additional information that may be relevant to the notified
transaction but which is not listed in § 800.402 of the Regulations.”); George
Stephanov Georgiev, Comment, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework:
Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 131 (2008) (pointing to the efficiencies generated by filing
voluntarily).
58
See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 239 (listing the three
thresholds to be met for safe harbor). For a criticism of the safe harbor provisions,
see Weimar, supra note 2, at 676 (“The single greatest shortcoming of CFIUS
review in the protection of national security is that it focuses almost singularly on
threats perceived in transactions ex ante, yet it lacks any review of relevant
activities once covered transactions have been completed”, which is compounded
by the safe harbor provision); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (describing the safe
harbor provisions in the regulations).
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Committee’s interests if the parties can clearly identify which
transactions may raise national security concerns and voluntarily
file to initiate the CFIUS process.
If the Committee determines that a transaction is a “covered
transaction,” it will commence an initial thirty-day review. During
this process, the Committee evaluates the transaction to determine
if it threatens U.S. national security, results in foreign control of a
U.S. business or asset, or results in foreign control of critical
infrastructure that may impair U.S. national security.59 The
regulations define “covered” as “any merger, acquisition, or
takeover . . . by or with any foreign person which could result in
foreign control” of any U.S. business, part of a U.S. business, or
U.S. asset by a foreign person.60 The key element of this definition
is “control,” which FINSA failed to define,61 requiring instead that
CFIUS prescribe a definition.62 The final rule defines control in
“functional terms as the ability to exercise certain powers over
important matters affecting an entity.”63 This vague definition
“eschews bright lines” and considers all relevant factors together
59
See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (describing the national security
review process).
60 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(a)(3). See also 31 CFR §§ 800.207, 800.301 (restating the
definition of covered transactions).
This includes but is not limited to
investments, joint ventures, and asset purchases, and includes transactions when
foreign persons convey U.S. businesses or assets to another foreign person. A
covered transaction does NOT include: (1) stock splits, pro rata stock dividends,
transactions resulting in a foreign person controlling less than 10% of U.S.
business that are only for investment purposes (narrowly construed objective test
looking for any rights to directorship, voting rights, etc.)—considering the
timeline of when they will get ownership (if it will increase above 10% later), and
noting that 10% is not a safe harbor—based on facts/circumstances and may not
be recognized on discretion; (2) acquisition of an entity that does not constitute a
U.S. business; (3) acquisition of securities or securities underwriter in the
“ordinary course” of business; and (4) acquisition pursuant to insurance contract
if made in the “ordinary course” of business.
61 For definitions of the other terms used in the definition, see 50 U.S.C. app.
2170(a) (defining a list of terms); Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70703–05.
62 See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70704 (“FINSA does not define ‘control,’ but
rather requires that CFIUS prescribe a definition by regulation.”).
63 Id. (providing the complete definition as “power, direct or indirect,
whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant
minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation,
proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal
arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide
important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but without limitation, to
determine, direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding the [matters listed in §
800.204(a)], or any other similarly important matters affecting an entity.”).
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when determining if a transaction is covered;64 however, the
definition becomes clearer by examining what is not considered
control. Most importantly, “a foreign person does not control an
entity if it holds ten percent or less of the voting interest in the
entity and it holds that interest ‘solely for the purpose of passive
investment.’”65 Although this does not provide an exemption
solely because the foreign person has less than a ten percent
interest in the U.S. business or asset, it provides clear guidance to
foreign direct investors. Therefore, the definitions of “covered
transaction” and each of their elements,66 in conjunction with the
discussions and examples contained in the regulations,67 allow
companies to assess if their proposed transaction is “covered” and
potentially subject to CFIUS review.
3.2.2. Forty-Five Day Investigation
CFIUS concludes the vast majority of its reviews within this
initial thirty-day review period.68 However, the Committee may
commence a forty-five day investigation if the initial review
reveals any of the following four situations: (1) the transaction
threatens to impair U.S. national security; (2) the lead agency
recommends, and CFIUS concurs, that an investigation be
undertaken; (3) the transaction will result in “foreign governmentcontrol” of a U.S. business or asset; or (4) the transaction would
result in foreign control of U.S. critical infrastructure that could
Id.
Id. (citing § 800.302(b)). The ten percent threshold is not, however,
arbitrary or useless. See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 31 (considering (1)
transactions notified under § 721; (2) non-notified transactions from which CFIUS
required submissions; and (3) transactions resulting in a ten percent ownership
stake of a U.S. company).
66
The Federal Register includes discussions of “covered transaction,”
“transaction,” “control,” “U.S. business,” “Foreign Person,” and “Transactions
That Are and Are Not Covered Transactions.” See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70704
(elaborating on the meaning of each of the terms).
67 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (providing nine examples of covered transactions).
68
Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (“CFIUS concludes action on the vast
majority of transactions within this initial 30-day period”); Cedarbaum & Preston,
supra note 41, at 238 (“CFIUS had traditionally approved the vast majority of
notified transactions during the initial 30-day period, but a growing number of
transactions are now being subjected to a second-phase 45-day investigation.”).
The Committee may also recommend withdrawal, but that is rare at this stage.
The clock will only stop ticking at this stage if the parties pull their filing, at which
point they must notify CFIUS if they are going to resubmit or cancel the
transaction. Id.
64
65
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impair U.S. national security.69 If any of these conditions exist,
then CFIUS may instigate the forty-five day investigation.70 After
an investigation, CFIUS only allows the transaction to proceed “if
it has determined that there are no unresolved national security
concerns,” which must be certified to Congress.71
3.2.3. Mitigation Agreements
CFIUS also has authority to “impose, and enforce, agreements
or conditions to mitigate any national security risks posed by
covered transaction[s].”72 From 2008 to 2010, sixteen transactions
implemented legally binding mitigation agreements, ten of which
occurred in 2010.73 Most agreements are reached during forty-five
day investigations due to the difficulties in assessing national
security risk, reaching an agreement, and implementing the
agreement during the initial thirty-day review period. CFIUS’s
authority to enter into these agreements is limited in two
significant ways. First, CFIUS can only opt for mitigation after
providing a written analysis that both assesses the national
security risks proposed by the transaction and proposes measures
to address those risks.74 Second, mitigation measures shall be
imposed “only if” the risks are not adequately addressed by other
69 Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 238 (listing the four situations
where an investigation is undertaken).
70 Review is initiated if the lead agency recommends review and the
Committee concurs, or if a member agency requests review and Treasury concurs.
This investigation is not to be used as an extension and is limited to evaluations of
the national security implications of a transaction. The scope of the national
security analysis will be discussed in Section 3.3. The national security review is
intended to be narrowly tailored. See Daly Statement, supra note 35, at 249 (“So
CFIUS is remaining a targeted, narrowly focused process that ensures national
security. It is not an economic means test, or an economic benefits test. CFIUS
remains focused on those important issues central to our open investment policy
and important to ensuring that the world and America stays open to
investment.”).
71 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568.
72 Id. This is authorized by Executive Order 11858. See Exec. Order No.
11858, supra note 12 (delineating the authority of CFIUS). The lead agency for the
transaction is responsible for carrying out and monitoring compliance with
mitigation agreements. See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 20–21
(describing means of monitoring and internal procedures).
73 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 20 (noting mitigation agreements
in the computer software, telecommunications, and energy sectors).
74 See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74568 (“[B]efore CFIUS may pursue a risk
mitigation agreement or condition, the agreement or condition must be justified
by a written analysis . . . .”).
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laws or regulations, such as the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (“ITAR”), the Export Administration Regulations
(“EAR”), or the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Mitigation agreements are a viable
Manual (“NISPOM”).75
solution and include a variety of options.76 However, the
discretionary authority CFIUS currently exercises may not be as
narrowly tailored to case-by-case reviews as the regulations would
suggest,77 weakening the claim that national security should not be
more clearly defined in order to protect the individualized process.
3.2.4. Presidential Power
At the conclusion of the investigation period, CFIUS will either
notify the President if it cannot determine if the transaction raises
national security concerns or will make a recommendation to the
President as to whether the transaction should be allowed to
proceed or should be blocked due to unresolved national security
issues.78 Using the Committee’s findings, the President will then
exercise his sole authority to suspend or prohibit the transaction.79
In order to do so, the President must find both that “[t]here is
credible evidence . . . that the foreign interest exercising control
might take action that threatens to impair the national security”
and that other provisions of law do not “provide adequate and
appropriate authority for the President to protect the national
security.”80 However, the large majority of transactions are either

75
See id. at 74568–69 (listing other laws that potentially preclude mitigation
agreements).
76
Examples include limitations on foreign ownership through special
security agreements, proxy agreements or proxy boards, limitations on voting
rights, and divestitures of parts of the business assets through asset sales, limits
on re-sales, and march-in rights, among other options. See ANNUAL REPORT 2013,
supra note 4, at 20–21 (giving examples of measures required of businesses).
77
See generally Zaring, supra note 33; see also id. at 117 (“These differences
should not obscure the fact that the CFIUS agreements contain a lot of boilerplate,
even though the Committee tailors its agreements, to a significant degree, based
on the nature of the acquirer.”); id. at 117 (bringing into question if national
security and mitigation is really case-by-case due to the presence of standard
terms).
78
Mir, supra note 4, at 6, 8 (describing the President’s authority to block
transactions).
79 Id. at 6; see also Guidance, supra note 38, at 74567 (describing how final
interpretation of the national security threat is made by the President if CFIUS is
unable to reach a decision).
80 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569.
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approved by the Committee without investigation, withdrawn by
the parties, or mitigated. Therefore, only a small number of
transactions have been referred to the President,81 and the
President has only blocked two transactions using the authority
granted under the CFIUS regulations.82 However, the President
could play an increasingly important role in blocking future
transactions.83
3.3. National Security
CFIUS review is limited to national security concerns, making
the Committee’s national security evaluation the key determinant
at each stage of the process. Yet, despite the regulation’s clear
definition of “control,” the regulations do not define national
security and provide only limited guidance as to how it is
interpreted.84 An examination of FINSA’s history suggests that the
vagueness surrounding the Committee’s national security
evaluation is indeed deliberate and is designed to give CFIUS
broad authority to block FDI.85 This likely stems from concerns,
particularly in the wake of 9/11 and the proposed CNOOC and
DPW transactions, that the concept of national security evolves so
quickly in response to new threats that it cannot be effectively
defined.86 Therefore, instead of relying on a clear definition or
81 Precise figures cannot be obtained. For estimations prior to the passage of
FINSA, see generally Zaring, supra note 33.
82 See Section 4.6.
83 See Zaring, supra note 33, at 124 (footnote omitted) (“Other scholars have
concluded that presidential power inevitably expands, both generally and more
specifically in the arena of foreign affairs. Further, critics of executive power in
national security matters tend to assume that, as a descriptive matter, the
executive calls the shots. Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal, for example, have warned
that Congress’s role in constraining the executive might ‘wither’ in foreign
relations law unless the courts act to protect it.”).
84 FINSA requires CFIUS to review covered transactions “to determine the
effects of the transaction[s] on the national security of the United States,” but it
does not define ”national security,” other than to note that the term includes
issues relating to homeland security. See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2007).
85 See Foreign Direct Investment Hearings, supra note 26 (statement of William
Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (“[W]e have not defined
national security. I think the intent of Congress was very clear, that national
security should be looked at in a broad sense” and that defining national security
would allow parties to structure transactions around the definition. Acting
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Chester Paul Beach, Jr., expressed
similar sentiments).
86
See Daly Statement, supra note 35, at 249 (explaining that “[t]hey will not
necessarily define ‘national security’ in and of itself: it is a hard concept to put
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guidance, companies are forced to piece together a collection of
sources that provide limited, vague direction regarding the
national security evaluation. These include FINSA and CFIUS’s
other legal frameworks, the Guidance, and the annual reports.
However, since these “are neither mandatory nor dispositive,”87
they do not provide an ascertainable conceptualization of national
security as applied to transactions.
3.3.1. FINSA §721(f) Factors
The CFIUS regulations do not define national security, but
instead provide only a list of factors for the Committee and the
President to consider when assessing the national security
implications of a transaction.88 The regulations do not list
industries or technologies generally subject to review,89 but the
Committee considers whether the transaction will result in foreign
control of government contractors and entities with access to
classified information.90 Section 721(f) of the Defense Production
expressly on paper, but FINSA already provides good direction.”); see also Byrne,
supra note 16, at 887, 888 (“[A]s presently constituted, the Exon-Florio system
strikes a proper balance between national security and open foreign investment”
due partially to lack of national security definition, which allows CFIUS to
“respond to novel or emerging threats to national security.”); Zaring, supra note
33, at 129, 130 (stating that “[n]ational security . . . is a term that few international
lawyers have dared to define, although it is the excuse commonly used to avoid a
variety of legal obligations. Although, since the onset of the war on terror,
national security law has assumed prominence, it is still the subject of little
international law scholarship” and that “other international institutions have
produced their own cautious judgments on what might constitute national
security.”).
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (stating that “[b]ecause
consideration of these factors is neither mandatory nor dispositive, their addition
does not place rigid constraints on the CFIUS process, but it does suggest that the
process would be more probing. At the same time, the adopted version of the Act
avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on their counter-proliferation and
counter-terrorism policies. Such a review process would have rendered the
review process more formulaic and less effectual”).
87 Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133.
88 See generally Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569–570 (listing the national
security factors considered on a case-by-case basis).
89 See generally Section 4.1 (citing the early concerns regarding national
security).
90 See generally Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and
Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. Part 800 (2008) (stating that
the transaction will result in foreign control of a U.S. business that provides
products, technical data, technology or services—either as a prime contractor, a
subcontractor, or a supplier to prime contractors—to U.S. government agencies,
state and/or local governments. This includes sole source arrangements,
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Act of 195091 lists and the Guidance restates92 the factors
considered by the Committee. However, the categories are very
broad and subject to interpretation by CFIUS and the President,
leaving little certainty as to what transactions raise national
security concerns.93
Notably, CFIUS considers the potential effects instead of the
realized effects of these factors, which gives the Committee
significantly broader authority.
The factors include the
transaction’s effects on: (1) “domestic production needed for
national defense requirements;” (2) “the capability and capacity of
domestic industries to meet national defense requirements,” such
as human resources, technology, and other supplies; (3) “a foreign
person’s control of domestic industries and commercial activity on
the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security;” (4) “U.S. international
technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security;”
(5) “the long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of
energy and other critical resources and material;” (6) “U.S. critical
infrastructure, including [physical infrastructure such as] major
energy assets;” (7) “sales of military goods, equipment, or
technology to countries that present concerns related to terrorism;
missile proliferation; chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons
proliferation; or regional military threats;” and (8) “transshipment
or diversion of technologies with military applications, including
the relevant country’s export control system.”94 In addition, the
Committee and the President may also consider “whether the
transaction could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign
government or by an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government” and “the relevant country’s record of
adherence to nonproliferation control regimes and record of
companies with access to classified information, companies with defense
businesses, and national security-related law enforcement).
91 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(f) (listing factors added under FINSA).
92 See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74569–70 (listing national security factors
considered on a case-by-case basis by CFIUS and the President in determining
whether a covered transaction poses a threat to national security).
93 See Weimar, supra note 2, at 674 (explaining that “[l]ike the term ‘national
security,’ many of the above-mentioned factors are intentionally left open to
interpretation by the Executive”).
94 Giovanna M. Cinelli & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Jones Day, Presentation at
the 2012 Export Briefing Series, CFIUS: A Primer for Foreign Companies
Acquiring U.S. Assets or Businesses, Part I, 46–50 (June 15, 2012) (paraphrasing the
national security factors listed in FINSA § 721(f)).
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cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”95
These factors leave open a potentially unbounded range of
interpretations, and it is becoming increasingly evident that CFIUS
will not hesitate to exercise this discretion.96 Moreover, CFIUS is
free to consider other factors as needed, which expands their
interpretive authority even further. This has led scholars and
practitioners to speculate on more specific risks the Committee
considers national security threats.97 However, these speculations
do not provide much more specificity and have limited predictive
value since the Committee does not provide them. As a result, the
vagueness of the factors and the Committee’s broad authority to
interpret the potential effects a transaction has virtually eviscerated
any predictive capabilities from FINSA §721(f).
3.3.2. Guidance
Recognizing the regulations’ failure to define national security,
FINSA mandated that CFIUS publish guidance in the Federal
Register “on the types of transactions that the Committee has
reviewed and that have presented national security
considerations.”98
However, the Guidance notes that it is
Id. at 51.
See Section 5.
97 For an example, see Weimar, supra note 2, at 667–68 (listing risks CFIUS
has considered: (1) “Shutting down or sabotaging a critical facility in the United
States;” (2) “Impeding a U.S. law-enforcement or national security investigation;”
(3) “Accessing sensitive data, or becoming aware of a federal investigation or
methods used by U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, including
moving transaction data and records offshore;” (4) “Limiting U.S. government
access to information for surveillance or law-enforcement purposes;” (5)
“Denying critical technology or key products offshore that are important to
national defense, intelligence operations, or homeland security;” (6) “Moving
critical technology or key products offshore that are important for national
defense, intelligence operations, or homeland security;” (7) “Unlawfully
transferring technology abroad that is subject to U.S. export laws;” (8)
“Undermining U.S. technological leadership in a sector with important defense,
intelligence, or homeland-security applications;” (9) “Compromising the security
of government and private sector information-technology networks in the United
States;” (10) “Facilitating state or economic espionage through acquisition of a
U.S. company;” (11) “Aiding the military or intelligence capabilities of a foreign
country with interests adverse to those of the United States.”) (citing EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 77 (2006)).
98 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170, at 261 (including “transactions that may constitute
covered transactions that would result in control of critical infrastructure relating
to United States national security by a foreign government or any entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government”).
95
96
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“necessarily illustrative” and “does not provide comprehensive
guidance on all types of covered transactions that have presented
national security considerations.”99 In addition, the Guidance
“does not identify the types of transactions that pose national
security risk, and it should not be used for that purpose.”100 As a
result, parties to transactions cannot use the Guidance to either
determine that their proposed deal is or is not considered a
potential national security threat. This means that all illustrations
contained in the Guidance have little predictive value, leading to
high levels of uncertainty with significant financial implications.
The Guidance breaks the types of transactions that have
presented national security concerns down into two extremely
broad categories: (1) those raising concerns due to “the nature of
the U.S. business over which foreign control is being acquired” and
(2) those raising concerns due to “the nature of the foreign person
who acquires control over the U.S. business.”101 However, the
broad nature of the categories and examples contained therein
makes them both too general to be of use to parties to a crossborder transaction. Regarding the first category, the Guidance
does not provide examples of industries, products, or other
information to help identify which companies would raise national
security concerns if subject to foreign control. In fact, the Guidance
explicitly avoids listing any industries that are commonly subject
to CFIUS review.102
Instead, four general subcategories of
companies are provided:
(a) government contractors,103
(b) companies producing products with national security
implications,104
(c)
companies
operating
U.S.
critical
99 See Guidance, supra note 38, at 74570 (stating that although CFIUS has had
“extensive experience” in reviewing transactions, it does not provide a
comprehensive list of which such transactions constitute a threat to national
security”).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. (“CFIUS is focused on identifying and addressing national security
risks posed by transactions, regardless of industry. Accordingly, CFIUS does not
focus on any one U.S. business sector or group of sectors”) (emphasis added). The
following industries are those that have been included: defense, smart grid,
munitions manufacturing, aerospace, software, radar, information technology,
telecommunications, energy, natural resources, industrial products, and structural
engineering. See also Jones Day, supra note 94, at 46–47 (listing industries of
interest).
103 Guidance, supra note 38, at 74570.
104 Id.
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infrastructure,105 and (d) companies producing certain advanced
technologies.106 Finally, the Guidance notes, “a significant portion”
of reviewed transactions presenting national security concerns
“have involved U.S. businesses” dealing in “technology, goods,
software, or services that are subject to U.S. export controls.”107
These broad subcategories do not provide sufficient guidance to
companies involved in transactions and could be construed to
encompass virtually any U.S. business. Moreover, these categories
are not exclusive. As a result, both CFIUS and the President have
almost limitless discretion by either applying these general
categories broadly or by identifying another category of U.S.
businesses causing national security considerations when acquired.
Regarding the second category, the Guidance provides even
less information. Besides repeating that CFIUS will consider “all
relevant facts and circumstances relevant to national security,” the
Guidance simply notes that transactions resulting in foreign
government control of U.S. businesses or assets will more often
raise national security issues than corporate reorganizations.108 In
foreign government-controlled deals, CFIUS seeks to determine the
purchaser’s capability to impair U.S. national security interests via
its control of the U.S. business and the likelihood that it will do so.
The Guidance lists certain factors relevant to this analysis109 but
does not give an indication of how these factors are addressed,
examples of their application, or quantifiable explanations.
Therefore, parties seeking to invest in the United States cannot
readily understand how these factors will be applied prior to filing.
The directions regarding transactions when the acquirer is not
a foreign government-controlled entity are similarly vague. The
Id. at 74569.
Id. at 74570–71.
107 Id. at 74571 (the Guidance does not provide any examples of industries or
products falling under this category, nor does it give any examples of export laws
to which the products have been subject).
108 Id. at 74571.
105
106

However, as emphasized previously, the fact that a transaction presents
a national security consideration does not necessarily mean that it poses
a national security risk. First, risk requires not only threat, but also a
vulnerability in U.S. national security. Second, the applicability of laws
other than section 721 has often resolved any national security
considerations identified by CFIUS when considering relevant national
security factors. Id.
109
Id. (stating that CFIUS takes into consideration all the circumstances such
as the policies of the foreign person, etc.).
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Guidance first notes that these corporate reorganizations present
national security concerns “only in exceptional cases,”110 and it
states once again that the Committee “considers all relevant
national security factors.”111 However, it does not provide any
further explanation beyond one brief example.112 Therefore,
international businesspersons are once again left without
meaningful direction from either §721(f) or the Guidance as to
which transactions will be subject to the Committee’s national
security review.
3.3.3. Annual Report
FINSA also requires CFIUS to submit an annual report on the
covered transactions reviewed over the previous year. The
Committee is directed to include information regarding what
CFIUS considered to pose a national security threat, such as the
industries and countries involved in the investments.113 Most
importantly, the regulations require CFIUS to include a detailed
discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions
on the national security or critical infrastructure of the United
States that the Committee will take into account in its deliberations
during the period before delivery of the next report, to the extent
possible.114
Therefore, the annual report is designed to provide companies
with a greater understanding of which transactions may be
considered national security risks in future years based on data
collected over previous years.115 However, even though risk from
Id.
Id.
112 Id. (explaining one example of a corporate reorganization that would raise
national security considerations).
113 See 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(m)(2) (requiring “[c]umulative and, as
appropriate, trend information on the business sectors involved in the filings
which have been made, and the countries from which the investments have
originated”).
114 See id. at 265 (requiring the Committee to report “[t]he types of security
arrangements and conditions” that it “has used to mitigate national security
concerns about a transaction”).
115 See Scott Morris, Remarks at Economic Politics and National Security: A
CFIUS Case Study, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 245, 253 (2008) (mentioning that
“[o]ur hope is that it will provide a great deal of information to the public,
including to the companies who are users of CFIUS, about what is expected of
them, about how CFIUS is looking at these issues, and about how it is thinking
about national security”).
110
111
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FDI is closely linked to certain technologies and industries,116 the
publicly available version of the annual reports have only included
vague information that is inadequate for parties seeking to invest
in the United States.117
The annual report’s discussion of sectors considered to be
national security threats does not provide much clarity for foreign
direct investors. Instead of providing a list of industries or
technologies that are prima facie national security threats, the
annual report simply breaks down the covered transactions filed
from 2008 to 2012 into four broad categories and certain select
subcategories. These categories are as follows: (1) Manufacturing;
(2) Finance, Information, and Services; (3) Mining, Utilities, and
Construction; and (4) Wholesale, Retail, and Transportation.118
First, the plurality of covered transactions has been in the
manufacturing category with 41% of all CFIUS filings from 2008–
2012, and 48% of these transactions involved Computer and
Electronic Products in 2012.119 Second, the Finance, Information,
and Services sector accounted for 33% of covered transactions, and
the Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services subsector made
up approximately half of the transactions in this sector in 2012.120
116 See Weimar, supra note 2, at 667 (“Rather, the risks posed by FDI tend to
be less systematic and more related to individual assets, sensitive defense
technologies, and critical domestic infrastructure.”).
117 Although the Committee prepares a confidential version of the annual
report that includes “information on the acquirer and the U.S. business acquired,
including the nature of their business activities or products, and details on any
withdrawal,” for each individual transaction CFIUS reviews, this information is
not available publicly. See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2.
118 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 4 (showing table breaking down
the categories by sectors); see also ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 3 (“Broad
sectors are defined using North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
or Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of the target company.”).
119 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 5 (showing percentages by
category). The primary Manufacturing sectors include: (1) Computer and
Electronic Products; (2) Machinery; (3) Transportation Equipment; (4) Electronic
Equipment, Appliances, and Components; (5) Chemical; (6) Fabricated Metal
Product; (7) Textile Product Mills; and (8) Leather and Allied Product. Id. at 5
(listing sub-sectors). For a breakdown of each sector into subcategories, see id. at
6–15; however, this information lacks specificity.
120 See id. at 8–12 (breaking down Finance, Information, and Services into the
follow subcategories: (1) Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services; (2)
Telecommunications; (3) Real Estate; (4) Publishing Industries (except Internet);
(5) Administrative and Support Staff; (6) Credit Intermediation and Related
Activities; (7) Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries; (8) Other
Information Services; (9) Rental and Leasing Services; (10) Repair and
Maintenance).
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Third, Mining, Utilities, and Construction has accounted for 18% of
covered transactions, and the Utilities subsector accounted for
approximately half of the covered transactions in 2012.121 Finally,
Wholesale and Retail Trade has accounted for 8% of covered
transactions, and Support Activities for Transportation made up
the largest subsector at 50% in 2012.122 These statistics, however,
provide little value to companies determining if their transaction is
covered, because they provide the proportions of covered
transactions by industry and do not indicate whether national
security concerns were raised.
The annual report also provides a breakdown of covered
transactions by the acquirer’s home country,123 including the
sectors of the target’s business, for the 2010–2012 period.124 The
most notable aspect of these tables is that the majority of the
covered transactions involved an acquirer based in a country
typically considered close allies of the United States. For example,
investors from the United Kingdom accounted for 21%, the
overwhelming plurality of covered transactions, and Canada and
France accounted for another 10% and 9%, respectively, of covered
transactions.125 It is also important to note that the Committee did
not note any clear investor tendencies based on the industry sector
of the target company,126 and the Committee did not believe there
was a coordinated strategy by any country to obtain U.S. critical
technologies.127 Although these statistics illustrate that no acquirer
host country is immune to review, companies will not be able to

121 See id. at 12–14 (providing a more detailed synopsis of covered
transactions).
122 See id. at 14–15 (giving a more elaborate summary of transactions that are
covered).
123 See id. at 17 (providing a synopsis of transactions by host country but
noting that statistics do not account for the fact that some transactions involve
multiple notices). But see Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (“At the same time, the
adopted version of the Act avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on
their counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism policies. Such an approach
would have rendered the review process more formulaic and less effectual.”).
124 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 18 (providing a breakdown of
transactions by both sector and host country).
125 See id. at 16–17 (noting the countries filing the most covered transactions).
126 See id. at 17–18 (observing only a few examples of industry concentrations
of investments by county).
127 See id. at 25 (stating that there was no identifiable foreign government
strategy to acquire critical U.S. technologies). For a breakdown of this analysis, see
id. at 25–29.
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discern anything ex ante about the national security implications of
their transaction due to the lack of correlation between the
countries and national security implications in the annual report.
The annual report’s discussion of the perceived adverse effects
of covered transactions on national security is even more limited
and does not allow companies to make any reasonable predictions
about the national security considerations raised.128 The details
provided basically amount to a restatement of the factors listed in
§721(f) with slightly different wordings and with certain factors
The only technologies and industries
named explicitly.129
mentioned explicitly are semiconductors, weapons and munitions
manufacturing, aerospace, satellite, and radar systems, cyber
security, and critical infrastructure.130 However, the listing of these
factors does not provide any greater clarity, because these factors
are clearly encompassed within the broad spectrum of §721(f) and
are seemingly obvious industries to be subject to some form of
CFIUS review.131 Finally, the report’s future projections of
considerations likely to arise merely states, “CFIUS will consider
whether the transactions may have the above-listed or any other
adverse effects in determining whether the transactions pose
national security risk.”132 Thus, companies achieve no greater
understanding of the scope of the national security review.
Therefore, the information considered in the annual report
provides only a high-level analysis of covered transactions and
does not provide companies with insight into whether CFIUS will
consider their transaction covered. Moreover, the factors are not
mandatory or dispositive, which leaves unbridled authority in
CFIUS’s hands when making national security determinations.
Although some may argue that it will become easier for the
Committee to identify trends and make predictions regarding their
national security review as CFIUS matures in the post-FINSA

128
These reports are mandated under §721(m). See ANNUAL REPORT 2013,
supra note 4, at 22 (considering “a broad range of national security considerations”
and stating that the list is not exhaustive).
129 See id. at 22–24 (stating the national security factors considered in 2012).
130 See id. at 21–22 (listing the national security factors considered in 2012).
131
See Zaring, supra note 33, at 131 (stating that “[d]efense contractors, raw
materials providers, and high-technology industries are all particularly likely to
be included in this encompassing view of what national security means in
economic terms”).
132 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 22–23.
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era,133 there is no evidence that CFIUS will provide more concrete
guidance regarding its national security review. In fact, the
Committee’s reach seems to be expanding, adding further
murkiness to the national security standard.
3.4. Future of CFIUS
An analysis of CFIUS’s history shows that the scope of its
powers has been gradually increasing since the Committee’s
creation in 1975. Most notably, the political reaction stemming
from the Dubai Ports World controversy led to the passage of
FINSA, which greatly increased the Committee’s power and left
the definition of national security open-ended. As a result, CFIUS
can reach a seemingly limitless array of transactions, and its
powers are likely to continue to expand as more transactions are
considered covered and subject to CFIUS review. There is
evidence that the Committee’s review has already extended into
other arenas and may be reaching beyond the “national security
rubric” when evaluating transactions involving energy and critical
In addition, a recent congressional report
infrastructure.134
recommended further extension of the Committee’s powers,135 and
the President’s powers under CFIUS are likely to continue to
expand.136 As a result, the costs explained in the following section
are likely to grow until the CFIUS regulations are amended to
include clear guidance on how it evaluates national security.137
See id. at 3 (noting the difficulty of identifying trends).
See Morris, supra note 115, at 256 (discussing extending CFIUS’s reach to
other, non-national security arenas and noting it will look at how new factors are
applied to energy and critical infrastructure to see if national security focus is
maintained). For an example of how these interpretations have been extended,
see discussion of Ralls Corp. in Section 4.6.1.
135
See generally CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS & RANKING MEMBER C.A. DUTCH
RUPPERSBERGER OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NAT’L SEC. ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMS.
COS.
HUAWEI
AND
ZTE
(Oct.
8,
2012),
available
at
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Hu
awei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf (discussing how the
Committee’s powers should be expanded).
136
See generally Section 4.6 (describing case studies where the expansion of
authority may continue).
137
See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 242–43 (“[C]ompanies can
expect that more transactions will be reviewed and that more reviews will be
exacting, resulting in full, formal investigations” and “they should expect longerterm interaction with, and oversight by, the relevant CFIUS agencies in the wake
of any deal that raises national security concerns.”).
133
134
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COSTS OF CURRENT REGIME

The lack of clarity regarding “national security” in the CFIUS
regulations imposes significant costs on parties engaging in crossborder transactions due to the uncertainty regarding which
transactions may be subject to review and the delays caused by the
CFIUS review and investigation process. This also increases the
Committee’s review costs, because many companies do not suspect
that their deal will be subject to CFIUS review and do not file a
voluntary notice or do not provide adequate filings. Thus,
although the Committee provides annual reports on the deals
subjected to CFIUS review, the figures provided do not accurately
reflect the effects that failing to provide sufficient direction on the
national security review inflicts on parties engaging in crossborder deals. In addition, many transactions are withdrawn while
undergoing CFIUS review or break down due to the restrictions
imposed by the regulations.138 Finally, many countries have
created similar government bodies, exposing U.S. businesses
seeking to invest abroad to retaliatory measures. As a result, the
lack of clarity surrounding the national security provision in the
CFIUS regulations imposes costs that far exceed any reportable
statistics.
4.1. Early Concerns
Concerns regarding the lack of a national security definition
predate the enactment of FINSA, as many commenters on the
regulations noted the potential costs that failing to provide a
definition would have for foreign direct investors.139 Chief among
138
See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 19 (“In 2012, CFIUS approved
withdrawal of 22 notices. The parties withdrew two notices during the 30-day
review period and twenty notices after the commencement of the 45-day
investigation period. In ten cases, parties re-filed in 2012, and CFIUS concluded
action in those cases. In two cases, the parties re-filed in 2013. In the remaining
cases, the parties abandoned the transaction for commercial reasons or in light of
CFIUS’s national security concerns, as described above. As noted previously, the
number of withdrawals in 2012 is a function of the specific facts and
circumstances of the particular transactions reviewed by the committee.”). Parties
may be withdrawing because these delays make the transaction no longer
feasible.
139
See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70705 (discussing commenters’ statements
regarding the scope of 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 and the implications of failing to define
national security); Shearer, supra note 3, at 1768 (“One of the most consistent
complaints directed at the statute concerns its failure to articulate clear guidelines
for determining what type of transaction may impair national security.”) (citations
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these concerns was that the ambiguity of the national security
factors could be used for protectionist purposes,140 which would
negatively impact the U.S. economy.141 Therefore, prior to the
broadening of CFIUS’s power under FINSA, commentators had
already recommended that the Committee truly define national
security by providing a list of technologies, industries, or countries
raising national security concerns, or by creating a multi-factor test
to make national security determinations.142
Despite these
comments, the final regulations note that national security reviews
must maintain flexibility and be conducted on a case-by-case
basis.143 While this greatly increases the Committee’s authority,
these early concerns regarding the costs of this uncertainty have
proven correct.

omitted).
140
See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1735 (“While Exon-Florio ostensibly serves
the legitimate purpose of helping to protect U.S. national security, its vague
parameters and elastic provisions create a potent protectionist weapon that
virtually invites abuse.”) (citations omitted).
141
See id. at 1733 (“If Congress does not define and narrow Exon-Florio’s
scope, this attitude may soon find expression at the expense of foreigners seeking
to invest in the United States, and ultimately, to the detriment of the U.S.
economy.”).
142
See Byrne, supra note 16, at 869–70 (“Various requests were made to
Treasury to define national security in the mergers and acquisitions context by
positive or negative lists, or by creating a multi-factor test. However, Treasury
rejected these suggestions because they were too limiting on the President’s
ability to affirmatively act to protect national security, and provided insufficient
guidance to corporations; rather Treasury stated that ‘national security’ should be
‘interpreted broadly and without limitation to particular industries.’ The
Committee also refused to issue guidelines outside of the Code of Federal
Regulations to generally describe national security, or to issue summaries of its
decisions.”).
143
See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70705 (discussing case-by-case approach
adopted in § 800.101). Also note that some people thought the regulations were
not strong enough for national security purposes, but they still thought the
national security factors were too vague. See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129
(“Prominent among the criticisms was the view that because CFIUS is chaired by
the Department of the Treasury, economic concerns would prevail over national
security concerns.
Furthermore, the definition of ‘national security’ was
sometimes interpreted too narrowly and the list of factors used to evaluate
national security threats was viewed as too vague.”); id. at 133 (“Because
consideration of these factors is neither mandatory nor dispositive, their addition
does not place rigid constraints on the CFIUS process, but it does suggest that the
process would be more probing. At the same time, the adopted version of the Act
avoids earlier proposals to rank countries based on their counter-proliferation and
counter-terrorism policies. Such an approach would have rendered the review
process more formulaic and less effectual.”).
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4.2. Available Data
The annual reports filed by CFIUS provide statistics regarding
the number of CFIUS reviews and the measurable financial impact
of these reviews.144 When taken at face value, these statistics
should not “strike terror into the hearts of foreign direct
investors.”145 Indeed, as of 2010, CFIUS had only recommended
that the President block a transaction on five occasions,146 and the
President recently blocked a transaction following CFIUS review
for only the second time in history.147 According to some, the first
instance, President Bush’s MAMCO order,148 “begged presidential
action” due to the unique nature of the transaction.149 However,
the impact of the Committee’s actions extends “far beyond sample
statistics,” because “[b]locking a transaction is a crude tool and
serves no purpose when more subtle remedies are available.”150
Thus, CFIUS review often causes parties to withdraw from closeto-complete transactions without taking any formal action to block

144
The public version of the report contains only vague information,
whereas the classified version contains significantly more detail. See ANNUAL
REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that tables containing information about the
acquirer and the U.S. business acquired is contained in the classified report but
that the public report contains only aggregate data). This is partially due to
companies’ concerns about disclosure of their confidential information. See
Weimar, supra note 2, at 235 (noting companies’ concerns about the disclosure of
their information in reports to Congress).
145
See Zaring, supra note 33, at 106 (indicating that CFIUS actions have
remained relatively stable).
146
Id. at 105 (“Over the life of CFIUS, the Committee has recommended to
the president that an acquisition be prohibited in only five cases; in all but one of
those cases, the president allowed the acquisition to proceed.”).
147 See Section 1. See also ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that
the President blocked Ralls Corporation’s wind farm project as a result of the
company’s Chinese ownership).
148
See Order on the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc., in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES BOOK I, 143 (1990) [hereinafter Order]
(prohibiting acquisition by MAMCO due to national security concerns).
149
See Zaring, supra note 33, at 104–05 (“That case . . . involv[ed] . . . an
American airplane parts manufacturer and a Chinese company that was [sic] both
owned by China’s Ministry of Aerospace Technology and affiliated with the
People’s Liberation Army.”).
150 See id. at 106 (“When the subtlety of the remedy is taken into account, the
Treasury says, ‘CFIUS has been very successful.’”) (quoting U.S. TREASURY DEP’T,
STAFF ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE’S REPORT: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, UNENCUMBERED ACCESS 2 (1991)).
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the transaction.151
Although the number of transactions
withdrawn in such a manner was initially not very large,152 it has
likely increased dramatically since FINSA. As a result, a greater
number of transactions are being prevented “with a wink and a
nudge,” but statistics of these instances are unobtainable.153
Therefore, when evaluating these statistics, it is important to
remember that the impact is much greater than the statistics
provided.154
Given the significant strengthening of the Committee’s powers
under FINSA and the scarcity of available data, only the statistics
compiled since 2008 are relevant to this analysis.155 In addition, it
is also important to note that the revision of the regulations
coincides with the 2008 financial crisis, which has significantly
151
See id. at 107 (“[O]bservers like Eliot Kang have been persuaded that
‘CFIUS’s investigatory scrutiny has led a number of foreign buyers to withdraw
from ‘done-deals’ or modify the terms of purchase.’ For example, informal
consultations may have deterred Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund from following
through on two recent proposed acquisitions of American assets. The managing
director of the fund noted that the deals ‘might meet political opposition in the
U.S.,’ though it is hard to know whether this opposition came from Congress or
reflected pressures from CFIUS itself.”) (quoting C.S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and
Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 INT’L ORG. 301, 334 (1997)).
152 See id. at 108 (“[T]here is reason for some skepticism about the possibility
that the Committee is a blocking machine. The news stories that do report that
mergers have failed on word from CFIUS are few, despite the fact that failed
mergers are actively covered in the business press. The Treasury Department has
said that the Committee approves most deals without a peep, and it downplays
the threat posed by the Committee when it meets with foreign officials.
Accordingly, the isolated cases of blockage that we do know about look more like
rare exceptions rather than exemplars of the rule.”).
153
See id. (“Accordingly, it is possible that CFIUS frequently blocks foreign
acquisitions with a wink and a nudge—we simply do not, and probably cannot,
collect the data on the subject, with only news stories and fleeting allusions in
reorganization opinions to guide us.”). There is also no guidance as the number
of mitigation agreements entered into. See id. (“It is hard to say how frequently
CFIUS imposes these agreements, as it does not report on the number of
mitigation agreements that it has concluded (or, for that matter, on anything other
than to Congress, and even then reports are often confidential . . . . [M]embers of
the Committee themselves have often said that conditions are rarely imposed on
foreign acquisitions . . . .”).
154 See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“When evaluating these criticisms, it is
important to remember that the number of foreign acquisitions that require CFIUS
review is very small and that the potential for harm in the form of negative
business attitudes towards U.S. firms abroad is disproportionately large”).
155
For statistics from the years prior to the passage of FINSA, see generally
Weimar, supra note 2; see also Zaring, supra note 33, at 104–06 (providing table of
the aggregate CFIUS data from September 1998 until December 2007 and a chart
on changes in CFIUS notifications over time).
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reduced the amount of FDI in recent years.156 From 2008 to 2012, a
total of 538 notices were filed with the Committee, resulting in 168
investigations, 32 withdrawals during review, 38 withdrawals
during investigation, and one presidential decision.157 These
statistics indicate that the number of transactions being reviewed,
as well as the number undergoing CFIUS investigation, is much
higher than prior to the passage of FINSA.158 Although the
number of notices dropped significantly due to the financial crisis,
the number of notices and investigations has since increased
annually.159 In 2012, the number of notices withdrawn after
commencement of an investigation increased from five in 2011 to
20 in 2012, and the President blocked a transaction for the first time
since 1990.160 These transactions represent a small percentage of
the total of such FDI flows into the United States, and the
Committee is not notified of many of the covered transactions
reviewed each year. This suggests that many companies are
unaware of CFIUS’s reach, or do not believe their transactions are
potentially subject to the CFIUS process. Therefore, providing
greater certainty through revisions to the CFIUS regulations could
affect significantly more transactions than the numbers reported
here.
Information about the financial value of the deals subjected to
the CFIUS process is even sparser. The only monetary value
provided in the annual report is the estimated $542 million value
of seven transactions with identifiable values involving investors
from countries complying with the boycott of Israel in 2012;161
156
See generally Eric Lipton, Questions on Security Mar Foreign Investments,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18invest.html. See also ANNUAL
REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 2 (“There was a significant decline in the number of
notices from 2008 to 2009, coinciding with the global financial crisis, followed by
an appreciable increase in 2010”).
157
See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 3 (providing table breaking
down deals).
158
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“The transactions which CFIUS
needed to investigate comprise only two percent of the total number of notified
transactions.”).
159 Id.
160 See id; see also infra Section 4.6.1.
161
There were 18 transactions involving countries that boycott Israel;
however, only seven had identifiable values. The transactions included: nine
from the United Arab Emirates, five from Qatar, two from Kuwait, one from
Lebanon, and one from Venezuela. See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 30.
In 2010, five of the deals were from the United Arab Emirates and totaled a value
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however, the annual report itself acknowledges that this figure has
no representative value relative to the entirety of the CFIUS
process.162 First, this represents only seven of the 93 transactions
filed with CFIUS. Second, this only includes the publicly reported
values of those seven transactions, and most transactions do not
make this information public.163 Therefore, this financial data is of
virtually no predictive value but can be assumed to be significantly
larger than reported based on the following direct and indirect
effects.
4.3. Uncertainty & Delay
The most apparent of the additional costs that can be attributed
to failing to adequately inform parties about the national security
evaluation are the financial costs of uncertainty and delay. First, it
is both a commonly understood economic principle and a
foundational principle of contract law that uncertainty is extremely
detrimental in the business context. By reducing uncertainty,
parties are better able to make informed business decisions in the
present and plan for future business arrangements. Therefore, the
uncertainty surrounding how “national security” will be
interpreted can impose severe costs onto the parties to the
transaction.164 Second, the entirety of the CFIUS review process
can take ninety days for one transaction.165 This can decrease the
of $1.353 billion. One transaction was from Kuwait and was valued at $40 million.
One transaction was from Lebanon and had no reported value. Id. at 32. Four of
the transactions involved information services valued at $1.113 billion. One
transaction involved commercial space travel and was valued at $280 million.
One transaction each involved semiconductors and telecommunications services,
but neither had a reported value. See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 34.
162 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 33–34.
163 Id. at 33.
164
See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1768 (“[B]ecause the ‘national security’
standard is susceptible to various interpretations, foreign investors face many
uncertainties when structuring acquisitions involving a company engaged in U.S.
interstate commerce.”) (citations omitted). One benefit of voluntarily filing is
reducing this uncertainty. See Byrne, supra note 16, at 888 n.221 (noting that
“[s]ome in the business world argue that the lack of a definition creates
uncertainty, and criticize the fact that the approach to national security depends
on the particular views of the presidential administration in place at any
particular time.”) (citations omitted); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (discussing
the potentially “waste[d] resources” involved in transactions that are unlikely to
receive CFIUS approval).
165
If the Committee conducts the 30-day review, 45-day investigation, and
15-day presidential decision process, then Committee approval will take 90 days.
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value of the deal and expose it to many risks, particularly in the
volatile international business context,166 and has the potential to
make the deal no longer profitable or desirable. Taken together,
this uncertainty can lead to a chilling effect that discourages
foreign businesses from investing in the United States. However, if
parties were able to determine whether their transaction raises
national security concerns and is subject to this delay, they could
contract in a manner that reduced the financial impact of the delay.
Therefore, by reducing the uncertainty and unexpected delays
stemming from CFIUS’s national security review, FDI would be
more profitable.167
4.4. Increase in Review Costs
Businesses are not the only parties that would benefit from
greater clarity regarding how national security is evaluated—
CFIUS’s operating costs would also be reduced dramatically
without sacrificing the effectiveness of its review. Although the
regulations and the Guidance were intended to prevent companies
from pursuing transactions destined to be blocked and to
encourage interaction between businesses and the Committee,
interaction between CFIUS and the private sector is extremely
limited.168 Since CFIUS does not provide adequate direction on its
national security evaluations, many companies falsely assume that
their transaction will not require review.169 This stems from either
a general lack of awareness of the Committee or certain incorrect,
yet reasonable, assumptions businesses make about CFIUS’s
national security review.170 Therefore, instead of anticipating the
Committee’s review and filing a sufficient notice, businesses are
caught off guard when CFIUS requests a filing. This often leads to
hastily prepared filings or contentious interactions between CFIUS
For example, currency values may change during this period of delay.
See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 252 (stating that an effective
regime would identify and resolve national security concerns “before the
transaction is formally submitted for review”) (emphasis added).
168
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 128 (acknowledging the benefits of filing
voluntary notice but stating that “the dialogue between the regulator and
companies has halted in the aftermath of the DP World controversy.”).
169 See Section 4.6.1 (detailing a circumstance which required review).
170 For a discussion of common misperceptions about the CFIUS process, see
Common Misconceptions Regarding CFIUS and the CFIUS Process, JONES DAY
COMMENTARY
(June
2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/common_misconceptions_regarding_cfius/.
166
167
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and the businesses,171 which unnecessarily wastes CFIUS resources
that could be saved if the businesses provided sufficient, timely
filings that allowed for a more efficient review. This could help
counteract concerns that providing clear guidance regarding
national security would expose the United States to increased risk.
The Committee has historically struggled to identify all
transactions subject to review, meaning that the Committee never
reviews certain threatening transactions, or it reviews them after
closing.172 This is likely to continue as FDI increases following the
recession and as the scope of the Committee’s review grows, which
could make the process “unwieldy.”173
Therefore, by providing businesses with a clear understanding
of which transactions may raise national security concerns, CFIUS
could reduce its costs in two significant ways. First, CFIUS could
reduce its costs of monitoring all FDI to identify potentially
threatening transactions that have not been filed with the
Committee. This would also have the added benefit of reducing
the likelihood that a threatening transaction goes unnoticed.
Second, the Committee could reduce its costs during the review
and investigation stages, because businesses would be more likely
to file voluntary notices containing all the necessary information
for the Committee to make a national security determination. In an
era of tightening government budgets, these savings would
undoubtedly be welcome.
4.5. Retaliatory Measures
Retaliatory measures by foreign direct investors and their host
countries pose another immeasurable, though possibly the largest,
cost of failing to offer clear guidance on which transactions will be
subject to national security review.174
171 Examples include Ralls Corp. and Firstgold. See generally Section 4.6.1; see
also Matthew C. Sullivan, Mining for Meaning: Assessing CFIUS’s Rejection of the
Firstgold Acquisition, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 12, 15 (2010) (citing Firstgold
as “a reminder to all foreign investors of the perils they may face if ill-prepared
for the CFIUS review process”).
172
See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1769 (stating that “many potentially
threatening foreign acquisitions escape CFIUS’s attention” because of the lack of
guidance).
173
See Weimar, supra note 2, at 676 (“As greater swaths of FDI become
subject to CFIUS review, the process threatens to become unwieldy.”).
174
International law permits exceptions for national security reasons. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 407 (1987)
(permitting exceptions to the presumption of extraterritoriality based on the
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In response to actions by the Committee that are seen as
protectionist,175 foreign businesses and governments often respond
by taking measures that decrease international business
opportunities for the United States and its companies. The
potential damages to the U.S. economy are severe since the U.S.
trade deficit is already over $34 billion.176 These measures take two
separate forms: (1) avoiding future investment opportunities in
the United States and (2) preventing FDI by the United States.177
This is particularly likely to occur with China, which has already
implemented a similar regulatory body that could block U.S.
investment in China.178 Although it is difficult to establish a direct
link between CFIUS’s actions and these retaliatory measures or to
quantify the costs of these retaliatory measures, there is sufficient
evidence to show that these costs are significant and likely to
increase.
4.5.1. Avoiding Future Investments
Businesses value certainty179 and freedom from intervention by
regulatory bodies. Therefore, as foreign direct investors become
“effects” and “protective” principles).
175
See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 16, 17 (citing the Firstgold case which
indicates that CFIUS actions occasionally result in retaliatory action).
176
See Lucia Mutikani, Weak Imports Drive U.S. Trade Deficit to Four-Year
Lows,
REUTERS
(Jan.
7,
2014,
1:02
PM),
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/us-usa-economyidUSBREA060HJ20140107 (stating that “[t]he trade gap [has fallen] 12.9 percent to
$34.3 billion,” according to the U.S. Commerce Department).
177
See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 17 (summarizing that “the critical Global
Times editorial argued that CFIUS’s reaction ‘would hold back many thriving
Chinese companies from investing in the attractive but politically dangerous
American market,’ and warned of a belief ‘in some quarters that striking down
Firstgold investment proposal, although it is small, may deal a blow to U.S.-China
relations. It probably will.’”) (citing Editorial, Toxic Mood over China’s Investment
in
the
US,
GLOBAL
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2009),
http://opinion.globaltimes.en/editorial/2009-12/453755_2.html);
see also
Shearer, supra note 3, at 1769 (“[F]oreign direct investment into the United States
will decrease and foreign countries are likely to retaliate by increasing the barriers
to U.S. companies seeking to invest abroad.”).
178
See generally China Publishes Final Rules on the National Security Review of
Foreign Investment in Chinese Companies, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Sept. 2011),
http://www.jonesday.com/china_publishes_final_rules/(remarking that China
has implemented new rules that provide for review and potential rejection of
acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign investors where such acquisitions
could affect national security).
179 See Section 4.3 (delving into how uncertainty affects business).
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more aware of transactions subjected to CFIUS review, they will
become increasingly wary of investing in the United States.180
Although these decisions cannot be directly linked to Committee
actions, decreases from particular regions or countries seem to
coincide with high profile actions taken by the Committee. For
example, analysts estimate that “foreign investment in the United
States originating from the United Arab Emirates alone fell by over
$1 billion in 2006” as a result of the Dubai Ports World
controversy.181 Similar statistics likely stem from other high-profile
actions by the Committee, such as the Firstgold,182 CNOOC,183 and
Ralls Corporation (“Ralls Corp.”)184 incidents, each of which
involved attempted investments by Chinese corporations. These
responses will be exacerbated by the expansion of national security
into other non-traditional defense industries like wind energy,
because foreign businesses will be uncertain whether their
technology fits into the virtually limitless application of national
security.185
4.5.2. Preventing FDI from the United States
Foreign governments are also likely to take retaliatory
measures to prevent FDI by U.S. businesses within their borders if
they perceive actions by the Committee as protectionist. By adding
the critical infrastructure and critical technology, the factors used
when making national security determinations have been criticized
as “broadly over-inclusive,” which “threatens to send the message
that the United States is taking an increasingly protective stance
toward FDI.”186 Indeed, many perceive CFIUS as a tool for
180 See Sullivan, supra note 171 (observing that Chinese investors continue to
fear U.S. resistance to acquisitions, which would result in the likelihood of
decreased investments due to uncertainty).
181
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 131 (indicating that investment in the
United States decreased as a result of the Dubai Ports World controversy) (citing
DP World’s Long Shadow, THE ECONOMIST (June 14, 2007), at 74–75).
182
See Sullivan, supra note 171 (recognizing the impact of the Firstgold case
on foreign businesses).
183 See generally Section 3 (discussing the CNOOC investment).
184 See Section 4.6.1 (describing the investment by Ralls Corp.).
185
See Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41 (analyzing the national security
provisions as a “wide-open” standard and remarking that “[v]irtually any deal
involving foreign interests on the acquiring side and U.S. assets on the acquired
side is a possible candidate for CFIUS review”).
186
See Weimar, supra note 2, at 677 (criticizing the FINSA as being
“overinclusive”); Georgiev, supra note 57, at 125 (“The frequent political

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE)

1260

10/13/2014 11:11 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

protectionist measures,187 and the broad nature of the national
security definition could allow for more protectionist actions in the
future.188 Whether or not these claims are valid, the perception of
protectionism by the United States is likely to strain international
relations189 and can lead to retaliatory measures that block U.S.
foreign investment within that country.190
Many countries have begun implementing CFIUS-style bodies
opposition to foreign acquisitions can be driven not only by genuine national
security concerns, but also by protectionist impulses.”); see also Sullivan, supra
note 171 (noting the political opposition to acquisitions by foreign investors).
187
See Pudner, supra note 14, at 1292 (“While CFIUS serves a vital role in
protecting the national security of the United States, it can, and has been, abused
as a tool for economic protectionism by U.S. companies and their Congressional
cohorts.”); see id. at 1292 (stating the adoption of certain measures such as the
“Exon-Pill in order to avoid an unwanted takeover attempt”) (citing Paul I.
Djurisic, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist National Security
Legislation Susceptible to Abuse; 30 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 193 (1991)); Matthew C.
Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire Alarms, Police Patrols and a New
Oversight Regime, 17 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 199, 206 (2009)
(providing evidence of examples where “members of Congress opposing on
national security grounds proposed transactions that would reduce jobs or
otherwise inflict economic harm on their constituents”). However, these concerns
may not be relevant with all transactions. See also Sullivan, supra note 187, at 238
(stating that “despite some concern that the Firstgold rejection represents a
continuation of perceived U.S. hostility to Chinese investment, there is no
evidence that CFIUS’s actual determination was based on considerations other
than the unusual circumstances that this transaction presented.”).
188
See Byrne, supra note 16, at 890 (“The risk of this lack of a definition of
national security, of course, is that this gap could be exploited by a future
protectionist-minded presidential administration to block transactions which
properly should not be deemed to be national security threats.”) (citing Editorial,
Ports of Gall, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2006), at A10); see Casselman, supra note 29 (“‘[I]t
is in our interest and that of the global economy that China continue to progress
toward becoming a more market-based, productive and dynamic economy . . . .
For our part, it is essential that we do not put that outcome, or our future, at risk
with a step back into protectionism.”) (quoting former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan).
189
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 130 (noting that “the increased interplay
between the regulatory framework of countries seeking to attract foreign
investment suggests that the CFIUS regime can have unintended international
effects”).
190
See id. at 126 (“If the United States is seen as using national security
review to engage in protectionism, this could provoke a protectionist backlash in
other parts of the world and hurt U.S. companies.”); see also Sullivan, supra note
171, at 15 (explaining that “CFIUS’s substantive determination may also prove to
be significant; although no evidence exists suggesting that the rejection [of
Firstgold’s proposed transaction] should be interpreted as part of a broader
protectionist shift in U.S. investment policy, the decision—barring further
clarification from CFIUS agencies—could further escalate trade tensions.”).
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that the governments could use for protectionist purposes under
the guise of national security review. Some prominent examples
include major U.S. trade partners like Canada, Germany, China,
and the European Union.191 Most notably, Article 12 of China’s
2006 Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors installs a similar body to conduct national security
reviews, leading to concerns that China will use this body for
protectionist purposes.192 However, the scope of its national
security review is “even murkier and less efficient”193 due to its
“vague and as-yet-undefined process and lack of investor
protections.”194 As a result, China could respond to CFIUS’s
actions blocking Chinese investment in the United States, such as
the recent prohibition of the Ralls Corp. investment,195 and prevent
an even wider array of U.S. FDI in China. Therefore, by providing
clear guidelines regarding what transactions raise national security
concerns, the United States could potentially increase FDI, calm
political tensions, and create more opportunities for U.S.
businesses to invest abroad.
4.6. Case Studies
Four recent case studies demonstrate the increasing recognition
191
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 130-31 (stating that “[i]n recent years, a
number of jurisdictions have begun establishing CFIUS-style bodies or
procedures, including major U.S. trade partners, such as China, Canada,
Germany, and the European Union.”); see also Pudner, supra note 14, at 1297 (“In
July 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for a European Union-wide
national security review mechanism based on the CFIUS model. In so
recommending, Merkel was careful to advise against the French model in which
‘a law defines strategic industries in a very broad way.’”) (citing Greg Hitt, U.S.
Foreign-Investment Debate Goes Global: If Congress Sets Tighter Restrictions, Other
Countries Could Enact Their Own Limits, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2006), at A4 and
quoting Hugh Williamson, Merkel Seeks European-Wide Vetting of Foreign
Acquisitions, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2007), at 6).
192 See Eric Jensen, Comment, Balancing Security and Growth: Defining National
Security Review and Foreign Investment in China, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 161, 162
(2010) (stating that “[i]nvestors fear that developing economies, including China,
are becoming increasingly protectionist under the guise of national security
review. Article 12 of China’s 2006 Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (2006 M&A Provisions) allows such review.”)
(citing Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors, art. 12 (2006) (China)). See generally id. (discussing in detail
China’s national security review process).
193 Id. at 161.
194 Id. at 162.
195 See Section 4.6.1 (detailing the Ralls Corp. case).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE)

1262

10/13/2014 11:11 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

of CFIUS as a barrier to FDI, the breadth of CFIUS’s national
security review, and the costs this imposes on foreign direct
investors, U.S. businesses, and the federal government. These
cases are Ralls Corp.’s attempted purchase of U.S. wind farms, the
failed merger between BAE Systems Plc (“BAE”) and European
Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. (“EADS”), the congressional
report recommending that CFIUS block all U.S. investments by
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (“Huawei”) and ZTE Corporation
(“ZTE”), and the approved acquisition of pork producer Smithfield
Foods Inc. by China’s Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd.196 By
discussing these examples, this paper is not stating an opinion as to
whether the transactions should be permitted either under the
current regulations or under the proposed revisions. However,
these cases highlight the costs of the current vagueness of the
national security prong in the CFIUS regulations and how
providing greater clarity could reduce costs for both businesses
operating internationally and the Committee.
4.6.1. Ralls Corp.
President Obama’s order that Ralls Corporation divest its
interest in four wind farm projects in Oregon in 2012 represents
196 While these proposed transactions represent the most significant
examples of the Committee’s growing powers, many other notable transactions
have recently undergone CFIUS review. For example, the Committee forced the
Indian company Polaris Financial Technology Ltd. to divest its 85.3% interest in
IndenTrust Inc., a US company specializing in digital authentication services for
secure cloud computing. See GOODWIN PROCTER, Publication, CFIUS Invokes
National Security in Ordering Indian Company to Divest Equity in U.S. Company (Sept.
27,
2013),
available
at
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/ClientAlert/2013/0927_CFIUS-Invokes-National-Security-in-Ordering-IndianCompany-to-Divest-Equity-in-US-Company.aspx?article=1
(mentioning
that
Polaris Financial Technology Ltd. were ordered to divest 85.3% by CFIUS). While
Polaris was forced to divest, the nature of the services provided and the
company’s provision of services to government agencies make the Committee’s
action less surprising. Another example is the approved acquisition of the
Canadian company Nexen by CNOOC. Michael J. De La Merced, Nexen Secures
Approval of its Sale to Cnooc of China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:10 AM), available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/nexen-secures-u-s-approval-of-itssale-to-cnooc-of-china/. An additional example is the sale of A123 Systems, a car
battery manufacturer, to the Wanxiang Group. See id. Finally after the parties
agreed to mitigation measures, CFIUS approved the acquisition of Sprint, the
United States’ third largest mobile carrier, by the Japanese company Softbank. See
Ziad Haider, China Inc. and the CFIUS National Security Review, THE DIPLOMAT
(Dec. 5, 2013), available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-inc-and-thecfius-national-security-review/1/.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12

12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

DEFINING ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’

10/13/2014 11:11 AM

1263

perhaps the most striking example of the potential costs imposed
by the array of transactions that CFIUS may deem national security
threats.197 The order came after the Committee initiated a review,
entered an interim order banning all further work on the project
while the review was conducted, and even negotiated a mitigation
agreement with Ralls Corp.198 After CFIUS determined that it was
unable to reach a national security determination during the
investigation, it referred the transaction to the President to either
block or approve. For the first time in twenty-two years,199 and just
the second time ever,200 the President exercised his authority under
the CFIUS regulations to block a transaction due to national
security concerns.201
Two executives of Sany Group Company, China’s largest
machinery manufacturer,202 own Ralls Corp., thereby satisfying the
197
See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the President
issued an order to prevent the acquisition and ownership of four projects owned
by Ralls Corp). Ralls Corp. was required to remove all property within two
weeks and to divest all interests within 90 days. The order replaced an interim
order banning further construction. See Sara Forden, Chinese-Owned Company Sues
Obama
over
Wind
Farm
Project,
BUS.
WK.
(Oct.
12,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-02/obama-bars-chinese-ownedcompany-from-building-wind-farm. The Ralls Corp. case is strikingly similar to
the Firstgold transaction in which a Chinese company attempted to take over a
mining facility located near Fallon Naval Air Station. The proposed deal was
withdrawn after CFIUS recommended that President Obama block the transaction
but prior to an order from the President. For a discussion of the Firstgold
rejection, see generally Sullivan, supra note 171.
198
See Forden, supra note 197 (explaining the timeline of the Ralls Corp.
rejection). For a discussion of the mitigation agreement, see Stan Abrams, Beating
a Dead Horse: Chinese Investment and the U.S. National Excuse, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19,
2012, 2:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/beating-a-dead-horse-chineseinvestment-and-the-us-national-security-excuse-2012-10
(discussing
the
mitigation agreement).
199 See Order, supra note 148 (blocking MAMCO’s proposed acquisition); see
also Forden, supra note 197 (stating that the Ralls Corp. order was the first time the
President has blocked a transaction in 22 years).
200
Forden, supra note 197; see also Siobhan Gorman & Juro Osawa, Huawei
Fires
Back
at
the
U.S.,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
8,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443982904578044190738613734.h
tml?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories (stating that the Commerce Department had
previously blocked Huawei from competing for a national wireless emergency
network, citing national security concerns).
201 See ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 3 (showing chart demonstrating
the percentages of transactions withdrawn, investigated, and decided by
presidential decision).
202
See Forden, supra note 197 (describing Ralls Corp.’s management
structure).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE)

1264

10/13/2014 11:11 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

foreign control prong of the CFIUS regulations. However, it is
unclear why the President decided that the project, which sought
to place five Chinese-made wind turbines in each of the four
locations,203 was a threat to national security. Although the Obama
Administration did not immediately provide an explanation of its
decision to block the investment,204 the media coverage of the
President’s order has offered two potential explanations. First, the
project’s locations were near the Naval Weapons Systems Training
Facility, which is used for bombing, electronic combat, and drone
training,205 and the wind farm’s proximity to this facility poses
national security concerns. Others claim that this cannot serve as a
justification since there are other wind farms in the area.206 Second,
others believe that President Obama blocked the transaction in an
attempt to appear tough on China prior to the election.207 Such a
motivation would reinforce the view that the breadth of the
Committee’s national security determination could be used for
politicized and protectionist reasons.208 Following the decision,
many international businesspersons expressed concern over the

203
See China Syndrome: Obama Blocks Purchase of U.S. Wind Farms by Chinese
Company,
HOMELAND
SECURITY
NEWSWIRE
(Oct.
3,
2012),
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20121002-obama-blockspurchase-of-u-s-wind-farms-by-chinese-company (noting that no reason was
given as to what risk the farms posed).
204
See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (pointing to the Ralls’ Chinese
ownership and the sites’ vicinity to restricted US airspace). The Treasury stated
that this is not a sign of future policy vis-à-vis China. See China Syndrome, supra
note 203 (citing a statement denying that this was part of a coordinated strategy
against China and that this was an isolated transaction). This case is very similar
to Firstgold, which was considered an exceptional case at the time. See Sullivan,
supra note 171, at 17–18 (stating that “[u]ltimately, fears that CFIUS officials’
emphasis on military installations disguised the committee’s true purposes
remain wholly speculative” and that “Chairman Jaskowiak unequivocally
characterized the transaction as ‘a very rare and unusual case,’ presenting its
rejection as ‘a clear decision that had to be made.’”).
205 For discussions of the sites location, see Naval Weapons Systems Training
Facility Boardman, available at http://nwstfboardmaneis.com; see also Forden,
supra note 197; see generally China Syndrome, supra note 203 (noting that planes fly
as low as 200 feet and as fast as 300 miles per hour at the site).
206 Tim Kia, a lawyer representing Ralls Corp., stated, “the President’s order
is without justification, as scores of other wind turbines already operate in the
area.” China Syndrome, supra note 203.
207
See id. (discussing accusations by Mitt Romney that President Obama is
not being tough enough on China).
208
See Section 4.1 (stating that adopting such measures could lead to a
protectionist attitude).
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implications of the decision,209 and Ralls Corp. filed suit alleging
that they were denied property without due process of law.210
However, this legal challenge is destined to fail, because the
Executive receives an extremely high level of deference in matters
of national security.211 In fact, the district court judge presiding
over the case and many leading attorneys in the field have noted
the dim prospects for Ralls Corp.’s legal challenge.212
Regardless of the merits of Ralls Corp.’s legal claim or the
reasoning behind the President’s decision, providing greater clarity
concerning CFIUS’s national security review could have reduced
the costs of this failed transaction. First, whether the transaction
would have been permitted under the modified regulations, Ralls
Corp. could have used these regulations to evaluate the likelihood
that the projects would be struck down during CFIUS review and
decided whether to proceed by weighing the risk of CFIUS action
against the potential value of the deal. As a result, there would
have been less uncertainty surrounding Ralls Corp.’s transaction,
which could lead to increased profitability.213 Second, if Ralls
Corp. determined that CFIUS was likely to initiate a review, they
would be more likely to preemptively file a timely and complete
notice instead of waiting for CFIUS to request a filing. This would
reduce the resources expended by both Ralls Corp. and CFIUS
209 Gorman & Osawa, supra note 200; Xinhua, US “National Security” Excuse
Backfires,
GLOBAL
TIMES
(Oct.
19,
2012,
2:15
AM),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/739386.shtml (stating that "[i]nvestors may
rethink their decisions if their assets are handled without legal basis or business
logic."); see also Abrams, supra note 198 (noting that "[i]f Sany loses, many Chinese
entrepreneurs may be more wary about future investment in the US.").
210
See Forden, supra note 197 (explaining Ralls Corp.’s complaint against
President Obama and CFIUS).
211 See U.S. CONST. art. II (listing Executive Powers, including foreign policy
and national defense); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (installing the famous and highly deferential two-step process
for overturning executive agency decisions); see also Zaring, supra note 33, at 124–
25 (noting that “critics of executive power in national security matters tend to
assume that, as a descriptive matter, the executive calls the shots” and “[j]udges
have opined that ‘determinations regarding national security are matters that
courts acknowledge are generally beyond their ken’ and that foreign affairs
emergencies may require judicial deference even on matters of constitutional
protection.”).
212
Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, No.
1:12CV01513 (D.D.C. filed on Sept. 12, 2012); see Forden, supra note 197 (describing
the likely failure of the case and the judge’s initial order); see also China Syndrome,
supra note 203 (stating that a suit was filed).
213 See generally supra Section 4.3.
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during review. Finally, had Ralls Corp. determined that CFIUS
would block their investment, they would have called off the
transaction, preventing the further waste of resources on a
frivolous deal.
Consequently, clearer guidance on CFIUS’s
national security review could have reduced the costs imposed
upon both Ralls Corp. and CFIUS in pursuit of an unsuccessful
transaction.
4.6.2. BAE/EADS Merger
The failed merger between BAE and EADS demonstrates the
Committee’s increased power, how the number of transactions
affected by CFIUS review exceeds the number reported annually,
and how clear regulations can reduce costs for both the public and
private sector. Although BAE and EADS withdrew the proposed
deal to create the world’s largest aero defense contractor without
ever filing with CFIUS,214 both the structure of the deal and the
parties’ actions in preparation for a filing signify their awareness
that CFIUS approval would be required. Moreover, the parties
withdrew the proposed deal once it became apparent that the
demands of the foreign governments involved in the deal could
not be reconciled with the foreign control requirements of the
CFIUS regulations. The costs saved from this early withdrawal
due to concerns regarding the “foreign control” prong demonstrate
how similar clarity in the “national security” prong could reduce
costs for foreign businesses and the Committee.
The structure of the proposed deal deliberately limited foreign
government-control in order to comply with the ten percent
threshold in the foreign control prong of the CFIUS regulations.215
From the beginning, the success of the deal was dependent on a
determination by CFIUS that the transaction did not result in

214
See Gopal Ratnam & Sara Forden, BAE Said to Brief Pentagon on EADS
Merger
to
Save
Status,
BUS.
WK.
(Sept.
28,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-28/bae-said-to-brief-pentagonon-eads-merger-to-save-status (noting that the estimated revenue of the merged
company of $94 billion would exceed the $76 billion revenue of Boeing Co.).
215 See Andrea Rothman et al., EADS Said to Mull Deadline Move as BAE Talks
Go
into
Weekend,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
6,
2012,
8:03
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-05/eads-struggles-to-meet-baemerger-deadline-amid-government-talks.html (discussing how French control of
EADS would be reduced from 22.5% to 9% and would prevent Germany from
purchasing another 7.5% of Dalminer).
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significantly greater foreign control of the merged company.216
Therefore, the parties took measures to ease U.S. government
concerns of foreign control by issuing special shares,217 ringfencing certain defense activities,218 and operating under special
security arrangements.219 In addition, both parties retained U.S.
counsel and lobbyists to seek CFIUS approval, and BAE arranged a
meeting with the Pentagon in an attempt to ease national security
concerns stemming from the transaction.220 However, it soon
became apparent that the French and German governments would
not approve the structure of the deal because of the limits placed
on their stakes in the merged company, and the parties withdrew
the deal.221
Although the parties never submitted the deal to the
Committee or reviewed for national security concerns, the parties’
216
See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing the parties’ efforts to
comply with the regulations due to their awareness of the necessity of CFIUS
approval).
217
See Steven M. Davidoff, The Many Complexities of an EADS-BAE Merger,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2012,
2:47
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/the-many-complexities-of-any-eadsbae-merger/ (discussing the issuance of “golden” or “special” shares to avoid
foreign control while still retaining some authority over the merged company); see
Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing the use of “golden” or “special”
shares).
218 The deal structure was flipped as to investment within the United States.
Thus, instead of a 60-40% ownership arrangement between EADS and BAE, the
parties agreed to give BAE 60% interest in US assets, because the US government
is more trusting of BAE. See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (explaining that the
structure of the deals flips for U.S. interests in order to placate the Pentagon’s
national security concerns); see also Davidoff, supra note 217 (noting the standard
structure of the deal).
219
See Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214 (discussing attempts to arrange
special security arrangements in order to avoid proxy agreements, placing US
individuals on the board, and other similar arrangements).
220
See id. (identifying the law firms and lobbyists named to counteract
political pressures against the deal and to navigate the CFIUS review process).
221
See, e.g., Marjorie Censer, BAE-EADS Merger Talks Collapse, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/baeeads-merger-talks-collapse/2012/10/10/e8a5f7aa-12dd-11e2-be82c3411b7680a9_story.html?hpid=z3 (explaining the collapse and withdrawal of the
proposed deal); Véronique Guillermard & Yann Le Galès, Berlin Accusé D’Avoir
Torpillé
la
Fusion
EADS-BAE,
LE
FIGARO
(Oct.
10,
2012),
http://bourse.lefigaro.fr/indices-actions/actu-conseils/berlin-accuse-d-avoirtorpille-la-fusion-eads-bae-292670 (discussing the French concerns of losing their
stake in the merged company); see also Ratnam & Forden, supra note 214
(discussing the companies’ desire to avoid proxy agreements, placing U.S.
individuals on the board, and other similar arrangements).
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actions demonstrate how clarity in the CFIUS regulations can
reduce costs. Since the “foreign control” prong of the regulations
is clear, BAE and EADS were able to structure the proposed deal
around the regulations and withdraw the deal once it became clear
that the foreign governments’ demands could not be reconciled
with the CFIUS regulations. This prevented the use of resources
both the companies and the Committee would have spent once the
transaction was under CFIUS review. Therefore, providing greater
clarity as to the “national security” prong could similarly reduce
costs. Critics may respond that BAE and EADS deliberately
contracted around the regulations and that international
businesses would contract around the national security
specifications, which would threaten U.S. interests. However, by
providing greater guidance while also retaining the President’s
authority to block a transaction, parties would have greater clarity
while retaining the government’s ability to protect U.S. national
interests.222 Therefore, as clear standards regarding CFIUS’s
definition of foreign control reduced costs in the failed merger
between BAE and EADS, providing greater clarity as to the scope
of the Committee’s national security review could reduce costs in
future transactions without sacrificing U.S. national security.
4.6.3. Huawei & ZTE
Another recent demonstration of the Committee’s increasing
powers and expanding influence is the recent congressional report
labeling Huawei and ZTE as national security threats that CFIUS
should prevent from investing in the United States.223 The report
recommends
labeling
both
companies,
which
sell
telecommunications equipment used for the operation of wireless
networks, as arms of the Chinese government seeking to steal U.S.
intellectual property and to spy on the United States.224
See generally infra Section 5.
See generally CHAIRMAN MIKE ROGERS & RANKING MEMBER C.A. DUTCH
RUPPERSBERGER OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH
CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NAT’L SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE
TELECOMMS. COS. HUAWEI AND ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Hu
awei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf (noting the threat to
national security and stating "Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of
foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to
our systems.").
224
See id. at 12, 2 (asserting that the companies’ evasive actions “only
222
223
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Specifically, there is concern that these technologies could be used
to intercept communications or launch a cyberattack,225 and the
report notes China’s history of economic espionage.226 As a result,
the report states that CFIUS “must block acquisitions, takeovers, or
mergers involving Huawei and ZTE given the threat to U.S.
national security interests,” and “[l]egislative proposals seeking to
expand CFIUS to include purchasing agreements should receive
thorough consideration by relevant Congressional committees.”227
Although the Committee has never officially blocked a
transaction involving either company, CFIUS has previously
issued an advisory opinion denying FDI by Huawei.228 Huawei, in
particular, has a checkered history with the Committee stemming
from its attempted acquisition of the U.S.-based firm 3Com in
2007–2008.229 Due to these concerns, the Committee should likely
block FDI by Huawei in the United States; however, these
objectives could be accomplished more effectively by providing
more clarity regarding the Committee’s national security
evaluation. The highly public nature of this report led to
immediate criticisms that the action was political and
heighten[ed] concerns about Chinese government control over these firms and
their operations” and noting that the companies seek “to control the market for
sensitive equipment and infrastructure that could be used for spying and other
malicious purposes”).
225 See id. at iv (Executive Summary) (stating that “the opportunity exists for
further economic and foreign espionage by a foreign nation-state already known
to be a major perpetrator of cyber espionage”).
226
See id. (remarking that “the opportunity exists for further economic and
foreign espionage by a foreign nation-state already known to be a major
perpetrator of cyber espionage”).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 12-43; Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Panel Cites Risks in Chinese Equipment,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/us-panelcalls-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threat.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&hp
(detailing the report’s findings and noting responses).
229
See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 228–29 (“The actions of the Chinese
corporation Huawei during 2007 and 2008 provide a stark counterexample for
other firms of how not to approach the CFIUS process. Their attempt to acquire
the U.S.-based firm 3Com came one year after a cyber attack on the Pentagon,
believed to have originated in China. Still, Huawei executives struck an
uncooperative tone, maintaining that the size of their investment meant it did not
warrant governmental scrutiny. Despite the existence of congressional resistance
to the deal, which was ultimately abandoned, several aspects of the 3ComHuawei transaction indicate that the deal would have failed to win CFIUS
approval without a dramatic restructuring.”). Of particular concern was the
founder’s history as a People’s Liberation Army officer and the company’s close
ties with Chinese military.
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protectionist.230
Indeed, scholars have warned that greater
congressional involvement in the CFIUS review process will lead
to protectionism, foreign policy dilemmas, and even Constitutional
issues.231 Others, however, think the Committee is sufficiently
insulated from congressional pressure.232 Although there is truth
to both of these positions, providing clearer guidance regarding
the national security prong in the CFIUS regulations would
eliminate some of the concerns of polarization and protectionism
while maintaining a limited oversight role for Congress, thereby
reducing the costs the regulations impose on international
businesses.

230 See, e.g., Gorman & Osawa, supra note 200 (noting the negative responses
following the report’s publication); see also Press Release from Ken Hu, Deputy
Chairman of Huawei Technologies, Chairman of Huawei USA, Huawei Open
Letter (Feb. 25, 2011, 00:00 AM), available at http://www.huawei.com/en/abouthuawei/newsroom/press-release/hw-092875-huaweiopenletter.htm (responding
to the company being labeled as a threat to U.S. national security); see also Xinhua,
supra note 209 (criticizing U.S. claims of security threats as baseless); Abrams,
supra note 198 (criticizing U.S. claims of national security concerns as an excuse
for other motivations).
231
See Byrne, supra note 16, at 849 (“Greater Congressional involvement in
the CFIUS review process would politicize the process in a manner that would
change Exon-Florio from a national security tool to a protectionist tool and would
raise serious constitutional and policy concerns.”); see also Zaring, supra note 33, at
103 (“The actual practice of the Committee shows that, although apparently a
hurdle that foreign acquirers rather fear, it rarely interferes with foreign
acquisitions—and when it does interfere, it does so in a pro forma manner.
CFIUS’s minute blockage record and its relatively modest imposition of
conditions on acquirers, when considered alongside Congress’s increasingly
important role in vetting CFIUS acquisitions, bolster the Congress-not-thepresident account of CFIUS that is proffered here.”).
232 See Zaring, supra note 33, at 101 (“In this way, Congress has turned CFIUS,
an agency at the heart of implementing the president’s policies on national
security, into an outfit that in many ways serves and is closely supervised by the
legislature. In a world where scholars bemoan the lack of oversight of the
executive’s national security determinations by the coordinate branches, CFIUS
may offer a way forward.”); id. at 120 (“Accordingly, while CFIUS is not a
nonexistent obstacle for foreign acquisition, it is Congress, sitting in review of the
Committee that really drives American policy in this area.”); see also Byrne, supra
note 16, at 891 (“CFIUS at present operates in an environment that is usually
isolated from political concerns, thus preserving the balance between national
security and an open investment policy.”); see also Pudner, supra note 14, at 1290
(“These reporting requirements add an appropriate level of Congressional
scrutiny by requiring notice and explanations of cleared transactions, but
importantly, and appropriately, only so require after the CFIUS process has run
its course, therefore insulating the CFIUS procedure from excessive Congressional
pressures.”).
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4.6.4. Smithfield Foods, Inc.
Although CFIUS ultimately approved the transaction, the
Committee’s review of Shuanghui International Holdings
Limited’s (Shuanghui”) acquisition of Smithfield Foods, Inc.
(“Smithfield”) represents the final notable example of the
Committee’s expanding national security review. Shuanghui, a
Hong-Kong based company focusing on the food and logistics
sectors, including China’s largest meat processor, agreed to acquire
Smithfield, a Virginia-based company and the largest pork
producer in the world in May 2013 for $4.72 billion.233 Aware of
the Committee’s increasing authority, the parties conditioned
closing on CFIUS approval and submitted a voluntary notice to the
Committee in June 2013.234 After conducting a 75-day review,
CFIUS approved the transaction without requiring any material
mitigation measures.235
The Committee’s scrutiny of the transaction marked a new
addition to the national security review: threats to the U.S. food
supply.236 Both Congress and investors warned of the national
security risks of allowing Chinese control of a major U.S. food
processor, and other concerns centered around U.S. jobs, food
prices, retaliatory restrictions by the Chinese government, and
possibly whether Smithfield facilities were near military bases or
other sensitive locations.237 Senate Finance Committee Chairman
233
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Publication, Shuanghui International Receives
CFIUS Clearance for its Purchase of Smithfield Foods (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/e2199a8c-3d7a-4c17-aad5553b0b0cc15d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d600e67e-ff8b-4e0d-904955f01abbb31c/SC_Publication_Shuanghui_International_Receives_CFIUS_Cleara
nce_for_its_Purchase_of_Smithfield_Foods.pdf; Shruit Date Singh & Bradley
Olson, Smithfield Receives U.S. Approval for Biggest Chinese Takeover, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-0906/smithfield-receives-u-s-regulator-approval-for-shuanghui-deal.html.
234
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 233, at 2.
235 Id. (noting that “notice of the clearance was filed in Smithfield’s Securities
and Exchange Commission proxy statement in connection with the upcoming
shareholder vote to approve the transaction”).
236
See generally Doug Guthrie, CFIUS: Often Misunderstood and Maligned,
FORBES
(Dec.
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougguthrie/2013/12/20/cfius-oftenmisunderstood-and-maligned/print (noting CFIUS's review of the Smithfield
merger was the first involving concerns over the national food supply).
237
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 233 (highlighting the various
US concerns arising from the acquisition of Smithfield by Shuanghui); Singh &
Olson, supra note 233 (noting that CFIUS might have considered the proximity of
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Max Baucus, Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Debbie Stabenow
all spoke out publicly against the deal.238 In addition, at least two
shareholders advocated for the breakup of Smithfield.239
Despite the deal’s ultimate approval, the Smithfield acquisition
demonstrates how far the Committee’s national security review
has expanded beyond what investors view as traditional national
security domains. The deal’s approval can likely be largely
attributed to the parties’ proactive filing and cooperative efforts.
However, most investors would not anticipate such transactions
requiring CFIUS approval, increasing uncertainty and leading to
prolonged reviews, and this broadening of national security review
further increases the likelihood of retaliatory measures.
These case studies illustrate some of the immeasurable costs
associated with the current form of the national security review
process and offer insights into how providing greater clarity
regarding CFIUS’s national security review could encourage FDI
while still protecting U.S. national security. These immeasurable
costs come in the form of delay and uncertainty, increased
Committee review costs, and retaliatory measures, which
collectively demonstrate the potential economic benefits of
providing greater clarity regarding CFIUS’s review.
5.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Due to the significant costs imposed on both private businesses
and the Committee by the failure to provide clear guidance
regarding the Committee’s national security review, the CFIUS
regulations should be revised to provide greater clarity to those
seeking to invest in the United States.240 This does not necessarily
mean that the Committee’s power to review national security
threats raised by transactions must be weakened.241 In fact,
Smithfield’s facilities to the military bases and the impact of the acquisition on the
US food-supply chain).
238
See Guthrie, supra note 236 (noting that Senator Debbie Stabenow
questioned the economic motivation of the acquisition); Singh & Olson, supra note
233 (highlighting that Senator Orrin Hatch urged scrutiny of the acquisition).
239 Singh & Olson, supra note 233.
240

Authority to define national security or adjust the national security
factors exists. See Shearer, supra note 3, at 1733 (“Given this discretion, future
administrations have the ability, without rewriting the statute or the regulations,
to define the ‘national security’ standard to encompass economic and industrial
policy concerns.”).
241
See Weimar, supra note 2, at 663 (“[W]hile practitioners have sought to
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revising the national security definition could make the
Committee’s national security review even stronger,242 while also
stimulating FDI in the United States through increased clarity.
This has led scholars to propose a variety of modifications to the
CFIUS regulations.243 While the proposals have merit, they are
either too limited in application, or fail to strike the proper balance
between encouraging FDI and maintaining the Committee’s
discretion in protecting U.S. national security interests.
This paper proposes modifying the CFIUS regulations
pertaining to national security in three significant ways: (1) the
Committee should publish a list of specific industries and
technologies, the acquisition of which is presumed to raise national
security concerns; (2) the Committee should publish charts of
acquiring countries and companies presumed to be a national
security risk; and (3) the Committee should clarify the application
of these regulations by providing more examples to which
companies can compare their proposed transactions. Although
this may seem like a daunting task, similar publications are
explain what types of transactions trigger CFIUS review, few have stepped back
to ask what types of transactions should lead to such scrutiny and what form such
scrutiny should take.”).
242 See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 129 (“[T]he definition of ‘national security’
was sometimes interpreted too narrowly and the list of factors used to evaluate
national security threats was viewed as too vague.”).
243 Some scholars have provided definitions for national security. See Byrne,
supra note 16, at 894–910 (outlining proposal that will: “(1) give Congress the
ability to pass a joint resolution reversing the president’s decisions under the
statute; (2) add economic security as a touchstone for CFIUS review; (3) enhance
CFIUS’s reporting requirements to Congress; and (4) shift the chairmanship of
CFIUS from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Defense or
Homeland Security”); Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the
Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance
Foreign Threats to National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J.
CORP. L. 293, 311-14 (2009) (making the following recommendations: (1) removal of
the mandatory investigation of foreign government-controlled transactions; (2)
creation of a separate committee to review all FDI transactions and initiate CFIUS
reviews; (3) rework the evergreen provision to only include intentional fraud by
the parties to the covered transaction; and (4) more secrecy in the CFIUS process);
Yiheng Feng, Note, ”We Wouldn’t Transfer Title to the Devil”: Consequences of the
Congressional Politicization of Foreign Direct Investment on National Security Grounds,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253, 300-09 (2010) (recommending implementation of a
more robust mitigation system and regulatory parity with the investing nation
when conducting national security reviews); Zaring, supra note 33, at 130 (stating
that some “have produced their own cautious judgments on what might
constitute national security”). For a discussion of the potential application of
golden shares to resolve matters of foreign government control, see generally
Byrne, supra note 16.
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available for export control regimes and could be used as
guidelines for CFIUS. In making these recommendations, this
paper draws considerably from these export regulations, which
have successfully balanced the encouragement of FDI and the
protection of national security interests.244
One may note that these recommendations are similar to those
rejected at the passage of FINSA when the Committee denied
requests to include lists of sectors, technologies, and countries
deemed to be national security risks.245 However, there are certain
key considerations and differences that make these changes a
suitable remedy. First, when rejecting these recommendations,
CFIUS had not yet published the Guidance or the annual report.
This is significant, because the Guidance and the annual report
have not provided the anticipated or necessary clarity regarding
the Committee’s national security evaluation. Second, the scope
and financial implications of CFIUS’s national security review
under FINSA were not yet understood. In the years since FINSA’s
passage, CFIUS’s powers have grown, and parties have become
increasingly concerned about the broad powers of this oncetoothless regulatory committee.246
Most importantly, the lists, charts, and examples proposed in
this paper will only create the presumption that the transaction
will be considered a national security threat. Therefore, discretion
over national security determinations would remain with CFIUS
and the President, allowing the flexibility to respond to the
continuously evolving nature of national security, while still
permitting foreign direct investors to make more accurate ex ante
determinations of whether their transactions will be subject to a
national security evaluation. Some may argue that leaving final
discretion with the Committee and the President would permit the
continued blocking of transactions for political and other reasons.
However, rooting these decisions by the Committee and the
President in concrete lists and charts would decrease the likelihood
of this occurring. Parties would gain a better understanding of
why transactions were denied, because CFIUS or the President
244
Although there have been criticisms of the export regulations, they are
primarily based on the extraterritorial application of the laws.
245
See Georgiev, supra note 57, at 133 (describing the Committee’s decision
not to list countries).

246

See generally supra Section 3.4 (discussing the expansion of CFIUS’s

powers).
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would be required to either link the decision to noncompliance
with the lists and charts provided or make a discretionary
determination. In addition, they would then be required to
publish redacted reports on these discretionary determinations to
eliminate unilateral decisions not rooted in genuine national
security threats. This would increase the accountability of CFIUS
and the President, because they would no longer be able to rely on
vague factors and would be forced to point to clear justifications
for blocking transactions. Therefore, parties would be able to make
more accurate business decisions based on their ability to
determine whether their transaction is subject to review, but the
Committee would maintain its ultimate authority to block
transactions for legitimate national security reasons.
5.1. Export Controls
The United States already has abundant experience in labeling
certain industries and technologies as national security threats, as
well as labeling trading with certain countries and companies as a
national security risk. Most notably, the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (EAA)247 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
(AECA)248 both regulate U.S. exports involving certain industries
and technologies for national security reasons. In addition, both
the EAA and AECA provide a chart or list of countries to which
certain exports are prohibited and where certain countries are
presumed to be national security threats. The international
community has also implemented similarly specific regimes,249
247
See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–72 (1979)
(describing the normalized extension of the EAA by Presidents). The EAA was
implemented by Export Control Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (1979). When
the EAA expired in 1994, the President exercised his powers under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) and extended
the EAA by passing Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 206 (1994). Every
president since has continued to extend the EAA in this manner.
248
See Arms Export Control, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2765 (1976) (listing the
relevant industries for which there are national security threats); The United
States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. 121 (listing technologies with defense
applications). The AECA was implemented by the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) and is further governed by TAAs and MLAs.
249 The Wassenaar Arrangement to which 42 countries, including the United
States, promotes “transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods.” It includes extremely detailed lists of
nine categories of dual-use goods, a sensitive list, a very sensitive list, and a
munitions list.
See Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, The Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
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demonstrating both the feasibility and international acceptance of
such restrictions. Using the effective balance accomplished by
these regulations as a guide, CFIUS could publish a list of
industries and technologies for which acquisition would be
presumed to be a threat to national security, which could then be
cross-referenced with a chart of countries and companies
presumed to threaten national security when investing in the
United States. Publishing these lists and charts would improve the
transparency of CFIUS review while preserving CFIUS’s robust
authority to block transactions threatening national security.
The EAA grants the President authority to regulate the export
and re-export of “dual-use” items, meaning items that have both
commercial and military applications, for reasons of national
security, foreign policy, and short supply.250 Parties seeking to
export items covered by the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR), which implement the EAA regulations, must obtain a
license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).251 BIS
publishes the Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes ten
categories of items, each containing particular items and
specifications that are subject to regulation under the EAA.252

Technologies
(Jan.
2012),
available
at
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2012/Basic%20Documents%20201
2.pdf (showing the origins of the Arrangement and providing information for
where to find the various lists mentioned above).
250
See Export Administration Act, supra note 247, at pmbl. (discussing the
president’s power under the Export Administration Act). The President names
the items to the list and has authority to establish President’s Technology Export
Council and Export Control Advisory Committees. Some claim the President’s
powers over export control extend too far. See Zaring, supra note 33, at 131
(“Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (“EAA”), the President has the
‘ability to block most exports to certain nations or to control the shipment of
specific technologies and goods to any country. This power provides the
President with an effective weapon for economic warfare, one he can use
unhindered.’ The justification for the President’s responsibility here also lies in
his control over national security.”). However, this is still preferable, because the
lists are published in advance so parties are not caught off guard.
251
See Export Administration Act, supra note 247 (explaining that licenses
must be obtained from BIS for items covered under EAR).
252 See Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 738.2 (2013) (listing the following
ten categories: (0) Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment; (1) Special
Materials and Related Equipment; Chemicals, ‘Microorganisms’ and Toxins; (2)
Materials Processing; (3) Electronics; (4) Computers; (5) Telecommunications and
Information Security; (6) Lasers and Sensors; (7) Navigation and Avionics; (8)
Marine; and (9) Aerospace and Propulsion). These categories contain extremely
specific subcategories listing items based on sizes, temperatures, and other details.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12

12_TIPLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

DEFINING ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’

10/13/2014 11:11 AM

1277

Moreover, every Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)
explains why the EAA limits the export of that item.253 After
determining if their export appears on the CCL, parties look to the
country chart, which clearly illustrates what countries may not
receive the export based on the reasons for which the item’s export
is restricted. Therefore, exporters can clearly determine whether
they are required to acquire a license in order to export specific
items to specific countries, eliminating uncertainty and promoting
cross-border transactions.
The AECA similarly limits the export and re-export of certain
items, but the AECA only restricts items with defense applications.
The Department of State administers the AECA under the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),254 which contains
the highly detailed United States Munitions List (USML).255 Items
appearing on the USML are subject to the prohibition of export,
and the President is required to report to Congress if he becomes
aware of a potential violation.256 Similarly to the CCL, this list is
updated over time in a variety of sources to keep pace with
changes in available technologies and national security threats.257
In addition, exports of defense items to certain countries, namely
Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, are subject to
sanctions.258 The AECA provides another example to emulate,
because the listing of industries, technologies, and countries can
effectively be presumed to raise national security concerns.
Despite the presence of these export examples for similar
listing mechanisms pertaining to FDI, CFIUS elected to eschew
253
See Commerce Control List, 31 C.F.R. § 738.2 (1996) and § 742 (1996)
(listing the following ECCN classification: Anti-Terrorism (AT), Chemical and
Biological Weapons (CB), Crime Control (CC), Chemical Weapons Convention
(CW), Encryption Items (EI), Firearms Convention (FC), Missile Technology (MT),
National Security (NS), Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP), Regional Stability (RS),
Short Supply (SS), United Nations Embargo (UN), Significant Items (SI), and
Surreptitious Listening (SL)).
254 See The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1976) Subchapter M
(containing ITAR regulations).
255 See 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1976) (containing USML).
256
See id. at Subchapter M (describing the nature of the USML restrictions
and the obligations of the President).
257
The BIS is responsible for updating the list, which is amended in the
Federal Register. The Defense Trade News published by the Department of
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs further clarifies the list.
258
See Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008) (listing the
various countries for which defense items are subject to sanctions).
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these successful models in favor of the vague and discretionary
system currently in place. Instead, parties simply report if the U.S.
business being acquired produces or trades in items subject to
these or other similar regulations.259 However, since there is no
indication as to the weight this factor will carry relative to other
vague factors in the CFIUS regulations, the regulations’ discussion
of these export regimes provides only extremely limited guidance
instead of the concrete determinations provided to exporters
applying those regimes.
5.2. Presumed Threats: Industries and Technologies
Using these export control regimes and the resources CFIUS
already allocates to its annual evaluations of whether there is a
coordinated foreign strategy to acquire U.S. critical technologies,
CFIUS should implement a list of industries and technologies
presumed to threaten national security. As noted above, the EAA
already breaks down items into categories and lists of specific
items subject to export restrictions based on the country to which
the item is destined. Certain categories260 receive near-blanket
restrictions. Therefore, should the Committee so choose, it could
label FDI in U.S. businesses operating in certain high-threat
industries, such as nuclear energy, as always presumed to threaten
national security. As a result, parties seeking to invest in U.S.
businesses operating in these industries would know that their
transaction would be subject to CFIUS review and potential delay
or cancellation. This would both benefit the investors through
greater clarity and expedite the review process by increasing early
filings.
Since only select high-threat industries would be subject to the
presumption of a national security threat, the list of technologies of
the U.S. business being acquired would be of greater importance.
As noted above, FINSA added the potential national securityrelated effects on critical infrastructure and critical technologies to
CFIUS’s national security review. However, CFIUS evaluates
effects on critical infrastructure on a case-by-case basis, noting only
that its definition “turns on the national security effects of any
259
See Fed Reg., supra note 1, at 70725 (noting reporting requirements for
items subject to export control).
260
For example, CB 1 (Chemical and biological weapons), NS 1 (National
Security), and MT 1 (missile technology) may not be exported to most countries
without a license.
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incapacity or destruction . . . over which a foreign person would
have control as a result of a covered transaction.”261 The
regulations define critical technologies as defense articles and
services contained in the USML, certain categories of items from
the CCL, specific nuclear equipment, and select agents and
toxins.262 CFIUS also assesses critical technologies in conjunction
with its evaluation of whether there is a targeted effort to acquire
U.S. critical technologies. In its annual report, the Committee notes
that, “[t]here is no single source that lists all U.S. critical technology
companies acquired by foreign persons,” requiring the
contributing export control agencies to use “a combination of
publicly available information, non-public data on M&A
transactions that CFIUS reviewed, and their own internal records
to identify the U.S. critical technology companies . . . .”263
Therefore, CFIUS already evaluates critical technologies but does
not publish which of these technologies are considered national
security risks in any publicly available source. As a result, the
Committee would only need to expend a marginal amount of
resources in order to produce such a list.
If the Committee published this information in public lists, it
would increase the transparency of the Committee’s national
security evaluation for foreign direct investors, rather than
perpetuating the ambiguity of the current reliance on the vague
FINSA §721(f) factors. Since CFIUS elected not to rely on these
export lists under FINSA, it may not wish to subject all covered
transactions involving these technologies to Committee review. If
this is the case, CFIUS could trim the list down to a more select
number of technologies and limit restrictions of less threatening
dual-use technologies to countries viewed as the greatest threats to
the United States.264 The important feature is creating a database
Fed. Reg, supra note 1, at 70708.
See 31 C.F.R. § 209 (1976) (listing the sources from which the Committee
draws lists of critical technologies); Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 41, at 246
(“The statutory definition of critical technologies, however, is expanded upon to
incorporate by reference the definitions from various existing regulatory regimes
that deal with export, trade, or handling of sensitive goods, technologies, and
services.”).
263
This included evaluations by the Department of State under ITAR,
Commerce under EAR and toxin restrictions, and Energy. See ANNUAL REPORT
2010, supra note 5, at 36. In total, 32 agencies and entities contributed to the critical
technologies section. For a complete list of the agencies and entities, see id. at 39
(listing the entities).
264
Admittedly, this will likely open the process to intense lobbying as
261
262
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that allows parties to determine whether their transaction is subject
to a national security evaluation prior to completing that
transaction. Similarly to the CCL and USML, the President and his
designated agencies could continuously update this list; however,
it needs to be made available for consultation prior to completing
the transaction in order to reduce unexpected delays and
uncertainty. This will also reduce other indirect costs, such as
retaliatory measures and review costs for the Committee, by
increasing the transparency of the national security evaluation.
5.3. Presumed Threats: Countries and Companies
Similarly to export control regimes, for those industries and
technologies not subject to the blanket presumption of threatening
national security, CFIUS should publish a chart of countries and
companies to be consulted in conjunction with the industries and
technologies list.
This chart could also include blanket
presumptions of national security risks for select countries, such as
state sponsors of terrorism, and certain companies deemed to be
puppets of foreign governments threatening U.S. national security
interests. Moreover, this chart could also be constructed fairly
easily based on the export models and the Committee’s annual
evaluation of investors by countries complying with the boycott of
Israel, or by countries that do not ban foreign terrorist
organizations.265
Since these charts include valuable trade partners, such as
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, CFIUS may wish to
limit the countries subject to this presumption to certain highthreat industries and technologies. In addition, China is both
commonly viewed as a threat to U.S. national security and as a
valuable trade partner. For such situations, this chart of countries
should be consulted in conjunction with the list of industries and
technologies. The key distinction is that instead of publishing a
vague evaluation of investments from these countries at the
conclusion of each year, CFIUS should make a consultable chart
certain industries seek to avoid being included in the list. However, the fact that
similar lists have been implemented in the realm of exports demonstrates the
feasibility of such a process.
265 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 30, 31 (listing Algeria, Iraq, Iran,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen as countries that comply with the boycott of Israel and
Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela as countries that do not
ban terrorist organizations).
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available to parties in real time.
Some may note the potential for diplomatic conflicts stemming
from countries being placed on this chart, and the potential for
retaliatory measures; however, these risks would be overstated for
a variety of reasons. First, the chart would only signify the
presumption that FDI from that country posed a national security
risk. Parties believing that their transaction did not in fact pose
these risks would be aware of this presumption and could file a
notice with the Committee seeking to prove their transaction was
harmless. Second, the chart would include every country in the
world, like the country chart published under the EAR, and would
draw distinctions based primarily on the industries and
technologies. Thus, instead of banning all investment from that
country, bans would be limited to certain defense articles and dualuse items, and be further restricted based on the specific national
security risks these items pose if acquired by that particular
country, which would limit the potential “shunning” effect and
resulting likelihood of retaliatory measures.
Third, similar
designations exist in even stricter form through both sanction
regimes and export control regimes, reducing the potential
backlash likely to result when countries are first determined to
threaten U.S. national security interests. Finally, countries largely
reliant on revenues generated via FDI in the United States may
seek to increase their conformity with the regulations and to
pursue diplomatic solutions.
Therefore, the benefits of
transparency outweigh the costs of publishing a chart of
threatening countries.
In addition, the Committee should consider publishing a chart
of companies whose investment is presumed to threaten U.S.
national security. These designations are likely to be based on the
belief that the company operates as a puppet of a foreign
government deemed to be a national security risk. The most
notable examples of companies that may receive such a
designation are Huawei and ZTE, which have essentially already
been so designated.266 By labeling a company, as opposed to a
country, as a presumed threat, CFIUS could narrowly tailor its
restrictions in instances where it does not wish to restrict all
investment from a particular country in that industry or
technology but has determined that a particular company is an arm
266
See supra Section 4.6.3 (discussing further the process by which Huawei
and ZTE were labeled as national security threats).
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of a foreign government.
Publishing sources for industries, technologies, countries, and
companies presumed to raise national security concerns could
reduce the costs of delay and uncertainty to foreign direct
investors, the Committee’s own review costs, and limit indirect
costs like retaliatory measures, because it would be clear which
transactions may raise national security concerns in the vast
majority of situations. However, in order to maintain robust
national security protections, the CFIUS regulations should
preserve the President’s ultimate authority to block transactions
but limit it to discretionary circumstances not covered by the
sources of presumed national security threats.
5.4. Examples for Discretionary Decisions
The CFIUS regulations provide only limited examples of how
they are to be applied, particularly for national security
evaluations.267 For instance, there are nine examples under the
“control” heading, and twenty-seven under the “covered
transaction” heading but none related specifically to the
application of the national security factors.268 In addition, CFIUS
has been reluctant to comply with requests to publish redacted
versions of covered transactions in the annual reports and even
reports to Congress,269 which may be an effort to avoid the cost and
burden of publishing such reports. However, by publishing these
lists and charts, CFIUS could limit the number of reports required
to situations where CFIUS exercises its discretionary authority to
allow a transaction that was presumed to threaten national security
or to situations where the President exercises his discretionary
267
Should this proposal be rejected, the Committee should consider
publishing examples of national security concerns for consultation by foreign
direct investors. This would increase the certainty surrounding FDI, though not
to the same extent as publishing lists of presumed national security threats.
268 See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2008); 31 C.F.R. § 800.301 (2008) (showing how the
few examples given do not include an application of the national security factors).
This stems from CFIUS’s desire to maintain a case-by-case evaluation of national
security concerns.
269 See Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 70714 (rejecting a commenter’s request that
reports on cases be made public, because “the national security effects of covered
transactions is based on, among other things, sensitive business information
submitted by the parties and classified U.S. Government information”); Sullivan,
supra note 187, at 235 (noting companies are concerned about their ability to
maintain the confidentiality of their information and “some observers maintaining
that Congress should receive only aggregate data”).
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authority to block a transaction not presumed to threaten national
security.
Allowing the Committee and the President to maintain this
discretionary authority would admittedly decrease the overall
certainty these proposed revisions seek to create; however, this
uncertainty will be extremely limited and balance the Committee’s
authority to protect national security interests. First, should the
Committee decide to allow a transaction presumed to threaten
national security based on the lists and charts, this will actually
benefit the parties by allowing the transaction to proceed without
delay. Second, the President’s powers to block a transaction have
not been a major problem. As noted, the President has only
exercised this power twice in the history of the Committee.
Although this could increase should the regulations be revised, it is
unlikely to be exercised too frequently because of the improved
accountability generated by the lists and charts of presumed
threats. Therefore, this discretionary authority can be maintained
without overly diminishing the certainty surrounding FDI.
Moreover, the regulations should require CFIUS to publish
redacted reports on the transactions where the Committee or the
President exercised their discretionary authority, which would
further reduce the uncertainty generated by preserving this
discretionary authority. Foreign direct investors’ concerns over
confidentiality would also be minimal, both because the reports
would be redacted and because they would only be published in
the rare event that this discretionary authority was exercised.
Therefore, CFIUS can maintain robust authority to protect national
security interests, while significantly reducing the net uncertainty
surrounding their national security evaluations and without
raising significant confidentiality concerns.
6.

CONCLUSION

With the passage of FINSA, CFIUS has transitioned from a
once-toothless entity to a powerful body with immense authority
to prevent FDI for national security reasons. Due to the vagueness
of the national security factors and the lack of transparency as to
how they are applied, investors are left with little clarity as to
whether their transaction may raise national security concerns.
This uncertainty imposes significant costs on foreign direct
investors, U.S. businesses, and the Committee itself. Although
these costs have not been effectively measured, they are
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undoubtedly substantial due to delays and uncertainty for
businesses, retaliatory measures, and increased review costs for the
Committee. Moreover, these costs are likely to increase as the
global economy recovers, leading to increased cross-border
investments, and as both CFIUS and the President continue to
expand the application of their respective powers under the CFIUS
regulations. Commenters and scholars noted these potential costs
early on, but in the heightened national security environment
following September 11th, as well as the CNOOC and DPW
controversies, CFIUS disregarded these concerns.
However,
CFIUS’s growing prominence, as highlighted in the rejection of
Ralls Corp.’s wind farm investment, has demonstrated the need for
revisions to the CFIUS regulations.
This paper proposes revisions that closely emulate the licensing
process in U.S. export law, namely the EAA and AECA. This
process involves the listing of industries and technologies whose
acquisition by a foreign entity CFIUS will presume to raise national
security concerns. This list should be considered in conjunction
with a similar chart of countries and companies presumed to raise
national security threats when investing in the United States.
However, instead of prohibiting transactions appearing on these
lists outright, CFIUS and the President should maintain
discretionary authority to allow a listed transaction or block a nonlisted transaction, respectively. The requirement that redacted
reports be published on every discretionary decision would limit
the uncertainty generated by preserving CFIUS’s discretionary
authority over national security concerns without raising
significant confidentiality concerns for investors. Therefore, by
implementing these revisions, CFIUS could better achieve its
objective of encouraging FDI in the United States while diligently
protecting the United States from national security risks stemming
from select foreign investments.
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